GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING
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ABSTRACT
This Article identifies a nascent phenomenon of “global
constitutional lawmaking” in recent World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) jurisprudence that struck down a certain calculative
methodology (“zeroing”) in the anti-dumping area. This Article
interprets the Appellate Body’s uncharacteristic anti-zeroing
hermeneutics, which departs from a traditional treaty
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and the past pro-zeroing under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) case law, as a “constitutional” turn of the
WTO. The Article argues that a positivist, inter-governmental
mode of thinking, as is prevalent in other international
organizations such as the United Nations, cannot fully expound
this phenomenon. Critically, this turn originates from bold ideas
which envision, and thus “constitute,” new institutional meanings
and possibilities within the WTO. They are anchored firmly by the
discernible purpose of cabining distortive and restrictive trade
consequences from the use of zeroing which have long been left
* Associate Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I extend my
deepest gratitude to Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler for his extraordinary
mentorship without which this Article would have never come to light. I also
thank Harold Koh, Bruce Ackerman, Benedict Kingsbury, Jeffrey Dunoff, David
Trubek, Charles Irish, Heinz Klug, John Ohnesorge, Jason Yackee, Sumudu
Atapattu, Claire Kelly, Arthur Pinto, Samuel Murumba, Kari Aamot, Gheewhan
Kim, Seong-Joong Kim, Jaehyoung Lee, Yun-Young Lee, and participants in the
Guest Lecture co-sponsored by the East Asian Legal Studies Center and the
Global Legal Studies Center at University of Wisconsin (Madison) Law School, the
International Legal Theory Colloquium at New York University Law School, the
International Economic Law Forum at Brooklyn Law School, the 2008
Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the Inaugural Conference of the Society of
International Economic Law, and the Third Trade Law Forum at Korean Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade for their valuable comments and suggestions on
earlier drafts. Maribel Nash and Daniel Crimmins provided excellent research
assistance. All errors are mine.

621

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

622

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:3

unchecked. Exogenous factors, such as domestic political support,
and endogenous factors, such as normative recognition by the
domestic legal system (“internalization”), can secure the legitimacy
and sustainability of such constitutional lawmaking.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Can we conceive “constitutional” norms at the global level
beyond the nation-state? Conventional international relations
(“IR”) scholars may be lukewarm to this c-word because it tends to
menace their ontological premise, i.e., state-centeredness.1 This
Article challenges that mainstream view. It argues that under
certain circumstances global organizations may self-generate
constitutional norms in an effort to regulate states’ behaviors that
ambiguous treaty provisions may not fully capture. The Article
finds a case in point in a recent development concerning a technical
issue in the WTO.2 This Article explores the dynamic process of
global
constitutional
law-making—namely
how
global
organizations, such as the WTO, can actually build constitutional
norms within their institutional contexts.3
Ironically, the WTO’s constitutional revolution originated from
a rather unspectacular calculative methodology in the
antidumping remedy known as “zeroing.”4 The WTO texts do not
1 See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its
Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354, 363 (1996–97) (observing that the
“continued centrality of the national and the state is ontologically necessary” to
conventional IR scholars); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and
International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 631 (2009) (stating that
mainstream IR theorists have often refused to recognize an international
organization’s capacity to “develop autonomous capacities to produce, monitor,
and enforce legal norms.”).
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
3 See Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization:
Toward a Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 422 (2009)
(contending that global constitutionalism is a “process of continuous
development,” rather than a “final good” akin to domestic constitutions).
Another critical aspect of global constitution lawmaking is in the area of “human
rights.” For an argument regarding the human rights dimension of global
constitutionalism, see Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International
Constitutional Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008).
4 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S.
Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 4,
2006, http://www.asil.org/insights060504.cfm (providing background on zeroing
and the Appellate Body’s reaction to zeroing).
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explicitly prohibit this practice, and public international law
principles, such as in dubio mitius,5 recognizes its members’
discretion to freely adopt the practice. 6 In fact, in what might
constitute “useful guidance,” a panel7 under the old General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) previously upheld the
same measure.8 Moreover, the WTO Antidumping Agreement
stipulates that when a provision “admits of more than one
permissible interpretation,” a WTO tribunal, such as the Appellate
Body (“AB”), shall validate a domestic authority’s antidumping
measure “if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”9
Under traditional rules on treaty interpretation under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), the WTO tribunal
would simply endorse the practice since it would interpret the
Antidumping Agreement in a literal fashion.
Surprisingly, however, the AB, in a series of high-profile
decisions, recently struck down all types of zeroing methodology
challenged thus far.10 These decisions are not a mere collection of
inadvertent rulings on the same subject; rather, they constitute a
deliberate and systematic pattern toward a new jurisprudence in
this area. The question then becomes whether, and how, the AB’s
5 This principle is a tool of treaty interpretation that gives deference to state
sovereignty. If the meaning of a treaty term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning
is that which is “the less onerous meaning to the party which assumes the
obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of
a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.” 1 OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
6 This discretion is a long-recognized public international law principle. See
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7) (stating that
sovereign states enjoy “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules”).
7 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XVI, para. 1 (“[T]he WTO shall be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the
framework of GATT 1947.”); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 13, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)
[hereinafter Shochu II] (finding that the reasoning of an unadopted panel report
may still provide “useful guidance”).
8 Report of the Panel, EC—Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes
Originating in Japan, ADP/136 (Apr. 28, 1995) (unadopted) [hereinafter EC—
Cassettes].
9 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A, art. 17.6 (ii)
[hereinafter AD Agreement].
10 See generally, infra, Section 2.3.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

624

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:3

uncharacteristic stance could be justified in the face of traditional
public international law, the GATT precedent, and the
Antidumping Agreement, all of which appear to conflict with the
AB’s position.
This Article construes the AB’s anti-zeroing position not as a
simple jurisprudential change but as a more serious judicial
revolution, which is tantamount to “constitutional lawmaking” in
its determined endeavor to contain WTO members’ manipulative
use of zeroing methodologies under the subterfuge of the textual
ambiguity of the relevant WTO norms. The AB, this Article
contends, has firmly recognized the structural damage that
zeroing, if left unchecked, could inflict on the global trading
system through the propagation of antidumping measures. At first
glance, the AB’s departure from the old GATT case law might
appear neither inevitable nor stunning. Admittedly, not all
interpretive shifts deserve the “constitutional” label. Critically,
however, it is not the shift itself but the nature of the shift which
should draw our attention to this development. Both the subject
matter and the unique topicality of the zeroing decisions render the
AB’s jurisprudential shift constitutional lawmaking via
international adjudication.
First, despite the missing “Constitution”—with a capital “C”—
global organizations may still need to reconfigure the power
allocated among themselves and their members with respect to
measures that seriously undermine their ultimate object and
purpose. To that end, certain fundamental, constitutional norms
within the meaning of the WTO should tame an egregious form of
protectionist politics that the zeroing practice denotes. The
unparalleled evolution over a half century, from a provisional pact
among a few contracting parties—GATT—to a full-blown
multilateral trading system as a public good—WTO—tends to
provide institutional maturity befitting such a constitutional
mission.
Markedly, global constitutional lawmaking in the form of
constitutional adjudication in the WTO has not sprung from a
vacuum. One can fully capture this nascent phenomenon only
with critical appreciation of certain historical contexts, namely the
unique topicality of zeroing and antidumping measures at present.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/1

2010]

GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

625

Trade remedies, such as antidumping measures, are widely
prone to protectionism.11 The use of antidumping remedies has
recently skyrocketed and they are rapidly replacing more
conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, which
rounds of trade talks have gradually demolished. WTO members
now invoke antidumping measures competitively and with
alarming frequency and intensity. Since the launch of the WTO in
1995, WTO members have initiated about 3,100 antidumping
investigations.12 In stark contrast, GATT contracting parties
initiated only 1,600 investigations in the four decades before the
1980s. More demoralizing is the antidumping measures’ highly
contagious nature.13 In what appears to be a defensive attack,
countries that have recently been globalizing—such as India, Brazil
and China—have now begun to imitate the developed countries’
penchants for antidumping suits.14
To make matters worse, the current global financial crisis has
exacerbated this already alarming trend. In a protectionist reaction
to the crisis, trading nations initiated more than two hundred new
antidumping investigations in 2008, an increase of nearly one-third
from 2007.15 Since zeroing can inflate dumping margins by as
much as 86%,16 the practice is likely to fuel the abuse of
11 See
generally Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How
Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357 (2009)
(arguing that antidumping measures often protect domestic producers at the
expense of market competition).
12 For antidumping statistics from the WTO, see WTO, ANTI-DUMPING,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2010) [hereinafter WTO AD Website].
13 For statistics, see WTO, AD INITIATIONS: BY REPORTING MEMBER FROM:
01/01/95 TO: 31/12/08, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init
_rep_member_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
14 Major developing countries have increasingly used the anti-dumping
measures since the launch of the WTO. WTO, AD INITIATIONS: BY EXPORTING
COUNTRY FROM: 01/01/95 TO: 31/12/08, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/adp_e/ad_init_exp_country_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
15 Press Release, WTO, WTO Secretariat Reports Increase of New
Antidumping Investigations, (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.wto.org
/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm. See Robert Guy Matthews, Steelmakers
Accuse China of Dumping in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at B1 (reporting that
the recent $2.7 billion antidumping suit launched by U.S. steelmakers against
Chinese exporters may indicate the beginning of a string of steel-dumping cases
against China).
16 Daniel
Ikenson, Antidumping Reformers Rejoice, CATO@LIBERTY
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/12/18/antidumping-reformers-rejoice/
(Dec. 18, 2006).
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antidumping measures, if it remains intact. In short, zeroing could
wreak havoc on the global trading system.
These disturbing developments within the global trading
system, have prompted the WTO high court, the Appellate Body,
to cultivate a new hermeneutics on the WTO Antidumping
Agreement, one that envisions new institutional meanings and
possibilities within the WTO that resonate with its telos:17 “an
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”18
This critical choice flows from the AB’s awareness of the
immediate and powerful normative consequences that would
affect the future of the WTO. In other words, the AB was well
aware that the AB’s adjudication would “(re) constitute” the WTO,
at least as far as antidumping is concerned. Here, the AB departed
from a conventional role of a triadic settler, or arbiter, of disputes
and instead assumes the innovative role of a “constitutional
court.”19
At this juncture, articulating what this Article does not present,
or represent, is in order. This Article does not claim that its thesis
provides an exclusive lens through which one may investigate
constitutional phenomena in global organizations like the WTO.
There are certainly different ways in which one can appreciate
constitutional issues in those organizations.20 Nor does this Article
attempt to construct a grand theory of the “WTO Constitution,” a
project many scholars appear to have undertaken.21 In essence,
this Article captures and theorizes one notable constitutional
dynamic as it emerges in the WTO.
Against this backdrop, my thesis of global constitutional
lawmaking unfolds in the following sequence.
Section 2
documents the jurisprudential transformation the zeroing practice

17 See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The
Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996)
(“Economic and political structures are not corporeal things; they owe their
existence to constitutive ideas . . . .”).
18 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl.
19 See Sweet, supra note 1, at 640 (highlighting the “constitutional
jurisdiction” of the highest courts, such as the WTO Appellate Body, for
reviewing members’ domestic measures in light of the WTO regime).
20 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2004) (arguing that the WTO, in
alliance with other international institutions, must develop a synergistic linking
within the constitutional structure of the global trading system).
21 See infra Section 3.1.1.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/1

2010]

GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

627

underwent between the old GATT and the new WTO. The AB’s
judicial abolition of zeroing is anchored firmly by a discernible
purpose: avoiding unfairness from an undue inflation of dumping
margins and minimizing uncertainty in administering
antidumping measures. Methodologically, the use of interstitial
norms, such as fairness, tends to furnish the AB with maneuvering
room for this teleological interpretation.22
Section 3 then attempts to conceptualize the AB’s judicial
revolution on zeroing through the conceptual lens of
“constitutional lawmaking,” which authoritatively reconfigures the
distribution of regulatory competence between the WTO and its
members. This Section highlights the AB’s innovative undertaking
of constitutional adjudication as a vehicle for constitutional
lawmaking in the WTO.
It also discusses the normative
consequences of such constitutional lawmaking as they relate to
WTO members and the WTO’s lower court, the panel. Finally, it
argues that the normative supremacy of constitutional norms
created by constitutional lawmaking applies to both WTO
members and panels.
Section 4 defends the AB’s constitutional lawmaking in the
form of constitutional adjudication.
Admittedly, the AB’s
constitutional adjudication is not without opposition. It has
sparked harsh criticisms, with accusations ranging from charges of
judicial activism23 to being a “kangaroo court.”24 This Section
22 See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character
of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 217 (M. Byers ed.,
2000) (observing that tribunals employ interstitial norms “not because those
norms are obligatory as a matter of law, but because they are necessary in order
that legal reasoning should proceed”). These interstitial norms function as
“standards” vis-à-vis “rules” in an adjudicative setting. See Joel R. Trachtman, The
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 350–55 (1999) (generally
discussing WTO rules and standards).
23 The United States, an ever-present defendant in these anti-zeroing
decisions, has denounced the AB’s anti-zeroing position as an improper form of
judicial legislation because it “[makes] up rules that the United States never
negotiated.” Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Finance, U.S. Trade Laws and
WTO, (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf.
Likewise, others have also asserted that the AB has violated the sovereigntypreserving standard of review enshrined under Article 17.6 (ii) of the
Antidumping Agreement, which they contend is modeled after the United States’
Chevron doctrine. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See also Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US—Zeroing: A Study in Judicial
Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 196, 200–02
(2006) (analogizing the Chevron doctrine to the zeroing and antidumping context
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responds to these criticisms by contending that international
tribunals, like domestic courts, often engage in judicial rulemaking via construction beyond mere mechanical application of
treaty provisions. It also warns that any “disarticulated,” selfrighteous concept of sovereignty mobilized to foreclose necessary
discussions in this area does not do justice to the contemporary
status of global market integration under the WTO system.25
Section 5 deals with an evaluative aspect of the thesis. It first
observes that exogenous factors such as domestic political support
may not exhaust legitimizing bases for global constitutional
lawmaking. This Section emphasizes those “endogenous” factors,
such as normative recognition by the domestic legal system
(“internalization”) that will eventually secure the legitimacy and
sustainability of such constitutional lawmaking.
Finally, this Article concludes in Section 6 that constitutional
culture in the global trading community—which harbors and
promotes a legal discourse of constitutional jurisprudence among
the community participants—is a critical catalyst for constitutional
lawmaking. Because trade inherently connotes a “transnational”
value, participants—importers, exporters, consumers and
investors—in the global trading community tend to be susceptible
to such discourse. It is this constitutional culture within the WTO
that liberates us from myopic mercantilism, which zeroing
embodies, and leads us to embrace the constructive normative
possibilities envisaged by the multilateral trading system,
particularly amid the current global economic crisis. Only this
liberation can redefine WTO members’ interests, and their
identities, from unreceptive or unapologetic advocates of state
sovereignty to enlightened norm-builders.26
to argue that “reasonable interpretations by Member States should be upheld by
WTO panels”).
24 Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Baucus Calls WTO ‘Kangaroo Court’ with Strong ‘Bias’
Against the United States, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. 167 (2002).
25 See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State,
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 393 (1994) (advocating harmony between “democratic
and international relations theorists”); Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and
Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48 (1992) (noting that political scientists are looking at
“grand pictures” that political scientists are looking at).
26 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483,
541–42 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Gemeinschaft] (suggesting a move toward greater
“global empathy”); Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John
Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade
Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81 (2006) (analyzing the normative underpinnings of the
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A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

2.1. “Zeroing”: The Epicenter of the Revolution
Dumping is a pricing strategy under which foreign producers
export their products at less than fair (normal) value, such as at
prices lower than their home prices or at prices below the cost of
production plus normal profits.27 Anti-dumping authorities and
the beneficiaries of anti-dumping measures, i.e., domestic
producers, attempt to justify the anti-dumping system as a
bulwark against foreign producers’ alleged “unfair” trade practices
which enable the latter to reduce the production cost.28 Since these
discounted sales are legitimate under domestic antitrust laws,
unless they are motivated by a predatory intent to drive out rivals
from the market,29 a number of economists and policymakers view
the anti-dumping system, which lacks such strict requirements, in
a negative light.30 Yet the GATT/WTO “does not pass judgment”
on the fairness of dumping.31 Instead, GATT Article VI authorizes
importing countries to “condemn” dumping if it incurs material
injury to domestic industries by imposing anti-dumping duties on
dumped imports.32 In other words, under these circumstances,

international trade regime). From the standpoint of sociological institutionalism,
Martha Finnemore envisioned “continuing and even increasing adherence to
multilateralism—even when it runs contrary to expressed national interests—
because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world culture.”
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1677, 34 (2009) (stating that sale at less than fair value
constitutes dumping).
28 See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED:
THE
DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW, xi (2003).
29 However, “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
589 (1986).
30 Alan Greenspan once observed that anti-dumping remedies are oftentimes
“just simple guises for inhibiting competition” imposed in the name of “fair
trade.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating
Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 725 (2000) (quoting Alan Greenspan, former
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Remarks Before the Dallas Ambassadors Forum
(Apr. 16, 1999)).
31 WTO AD Website, supra note 12.
32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1.
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importing countries may impose anti-dumping duties on dumped
products to offset any allegedly unfair effects.
Under a typical anti-dumping investigation, the amount of
anti-dumping duties corresponds with the magnitude of dumping
(“dumping margin”), which is defined as a gap between domestic
price (normal value) and export price. In the United States, the
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) calculates dumping margins.
The DOC determines an overall dumping margin over a particular
product under investigation by adding up multiple dumping
margins (“Potential Uncollectible Dumping Duties” or “PUDD”)
collected from various sub-product groups (“averaging groups”
specified by “Control Numbers” or “CONNUM”) of the same
product.33 In doing so, the DOC ignores (“zeros”) any “negative”
PUDD (any excess of export prices over normal values) in each
group. Consequently, an overall dumping margin (a total sum of
multiple PUDDs) is inflated since the zeroing methodology
prevents those negative individual dumping margins from
offsetting positive individual dumping margins. According to one
study, dumping margins would have been 86% lower if zeroing
had not been employed.34 The DOC uses this methodology not
only in an original investigation but also in the subsequent stage of
investigation, such as an “administrative review” under which it
may annually compute a company-specific dumping margin upon
a request by interested parties.35
Suppose that a foreign widget producer makes two U.S. sales.36
The first U.S. sale (export) concerns Model A, and is given
CONNUM #1. This sale is made at fifty cents per unit with 100
units. The second sale involves Model B, and is assigned
CONNUM #2. This sale is made at a dollar and fifty cents per unit
with 100 units. The weighted-average normal value (home market
price) is one dollar in both sales. The weighted-average margin for
the first and the second sale is 50 cents and minus 50 cents,
respectively. Each PUDD is calculated as a unit margin multiplied

33 See IMPORT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, ch. 6
(Fair Value Comparisons), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html
[hereinafter AD MANUAL] (discussing the detailed methodology of the DOC’s
calculation of dumping margins).
34 Ikenson, supra note 16.
35 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (2008) (mandating methods for periodic review of the
amount of the anti-dumping duty).
36 AD MANUAL, supra note 33.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/1

2010]

GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

631

by total units sold. In the U.S. sale No.1 (CONNUM #1), the
PUDD is 50 dollars, while in the U.S. sale No.2 (CONNUM #2) the
PUDD is minus 50 dollars. The total PUDD is a sum of these
individual PUDDs. In this example, the total PUDD would be 0
(50 minus 50) dollars.
However, under the zeroing practice the DOC ignores
(“zeros”) any negative PUDD before summing up. Therefore, the
total PUDD in this example is still 50 (50 plus 0) dollars, and the
weighted-average dumping margin, which is total PUDD/total
value of U.S. sales, is 25% (50/(50+150)). In sum, the dumping
margin is inflated by 25% in this hypothetical case on account of
zeroing because it would have been 0% ((50-50)/(50+150)) without
zeroing. This zeroing practice under the ordinary (weighted
average-to-weighted average) comparison method is called “model
zeroing.”37 In the administrative review, as in an ordinary
investigation process, any negative individual dumping margins
(such as weighted average normal value minus individual export
prices) are zeroed, which is called “simple zeroing.”38
2.2. The Ancien Régime: The Old GATT Jurisprudence on Zeroing39
In EC—Audio Cassettes (1995), Japan complained that the EC’s
zeroing practice led to arbitrary results in the calculation of
dumping margins since the practice tended to inflate dumping
margins vis-à-vis the normal averaging (non-zeroing)
methodology.40 Japan therefore argued that such methodology
violated Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 6) of the Tokyo Round
Antidumping Code, requiring “fair comparison,”41 as well as
Article 8 (paragraph 3), stipulating that the amount of antidumping duties should not exceed the actual dumping margin.42
However, the EC responded that Article 2 concerned only those
37 Panel Report, United States—Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 2.3, WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005).
38 Id. ¶ 2.5.
39 Unlike the WTO, under the old GATT system any party, including a losing
party, could “veto” the adoption of a panel report so that the report would not be
legally “binding.” However, even such an unadopted report was still regarded as
a useful legal guidance. See, e.g., Shochu II, supra note 7.
40 EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 115.
41 The same rule now appears in Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 4) of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. AD Agreement, supra note 9.
42 The same rule now appears in Article 9 (paragraph 3) of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. AD Agreement, supra note 9.
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circumstances in which normal prices exceed export prices and did
not cover the opposite situation where export prices exceed normal
prices.43 While Japan accentuated the unfairness of zeroing by
highlighting the eventual consequences of zeroing, the EC simply
adopted the narrow textualist reading of Articles 2 and 8 from
which it attempted to legitimize the zeroing methodology.
The panel sided with the EC in its decision, which was
reminiscent of the Lotus doctrine.44 The panel opined that nothing
in Article 2 prevented the EC from adopting other calculative
methodologies than normal averaging.45 Therefore, an antidumping authority would not need to consider any negative
dumping margins because it would obtain a separate dumping
margin from each comparison between a price of a particular
transaction in the home market (a normal value) and a price of yet
another particular transaction in the export market (an export
price). Whenever an export price exceeds a home price, such a
negative margin instantaneously becomes a zero margin under this
single transaction framework.46
Under the panel’s approach, anti-dumping authorities would
enjoy an option not to “aggregate” multiple results of multiple
individual comparisons between home and export transactions.
Such option tends to render fortuitous, and thus insignificant, the
eventuality of final dumping margins being exaggerated. Here, the
panel ignored the general necessity of aggregating multiple results
of comparison in any comparison methodology. It assumed,
wrongly, that the necessity of aggregation would occur only under
an average-to-average comparison methodology. Therefore, the
panel rejected Japan’s argument for the aggregation by opining
that Article 2 would not require anti-dumping authorities to use
exclusively the average-to-average comparison methodology.47
The panel report was not adopted, reflecting the high political
profile that it engendered.
Subsequently, despite intense

EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 119.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7).
45 EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 350.
46 Id. ¶ 356 (“[I]f the existence and extent of dumping and the imposition of
duties had been conducted on a transaction-to-transaction basis, the EC would
have been entitled to impose a duty with respect to dumped transactions, where
injury existed, irrespective of the prices at which other undumped transactions
occurred.”).
47 Id. ¶ 358.
43
44
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negotiations under the Uruguay Round, WTO members failed to
provide clear rules on zeroing.48 As a result, this controversial
practice had been quite prevalent among the main users of antidumping remedies, such as the U.S. and the EU, when India
challenged the practice for the first time under the WTO system.49
2.3. The Making of the Revolution: The Anti-Zeroing Jurisprudence in
the WTO
2.3.1.

The Genesis

2.3.1.1.

EC—Bed Linen (2001)

Echoing EC—Audio Cassettes, the EC clung to strict textualism
and argued that Article 2 (Determination of Dumping) of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement rendered no guide on how to combine
individual dumping margins for specific product types to calculate
an overall rate of dumping margin for the product under
investigation.50 The EC held that a “dumping margin” under the
Agreement could be established “for each product type or for each
individual transaction” as well as for the product as a whole.51 It is
not difficult to read between the lines of the EC position. To
implement the zeroing methodology, one should logically
recognize each transaction as a separable segment (an individual
transaction or a sub-product category) of the product under
investigation. Only in this way can one avoid including negative
individual dumping margins in the calculation of an overall
dumping margin for the product as a whole. In other words, this
fragmentation of a product into autonomous transactional units
prevents any negative results in one sub-product (transaction)
category from offsetting any positive results in other sub-product
categories.

48 Terence P. Stewart, Antidumping, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 1383, 1540 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993).
49 See John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law
Legislation?, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 113, 118 (2003) (observing that zeroing has been a
common practice in the anti-dumping community).
50 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, ¶ 11, WT/DS141/AB/R, (Mar. 12,
2001). [hereinafter EC —Bed Linen].
51 Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis in original).
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However, in a surprising turn from the old GATT
jurisprudence the AB rejected the EC position. It ruled that the
dumping margin should be established “for the product—cottontype bed linen—and not for the various types or models of that
product.”52 The EC should have “compare[d] the weighted average
normal value with the weighted average of prices of all comparable
export transactions,” which include those transactions with negative
individual dumping margins.53 Therefore, the EC failed to take into
account these transactions by zeroing the minus dumping margins.54
The AB invoked a general obligation of “fair comparison” under
Article 2 as it implied that the zeroing methodology would entail
unfair results.55 This is exactly what Japan had presented in EC—
Audio Cassettes. Japan’s position, which had been rejected by a
GATT panel in 1995, was finally vindicated by the AB. This is the
very first AB decision which struck down the zeroing practice. Yet it
was just the beginning of the WTO anti-zeroing jurisprudence.
2.3.1.2.

U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (2004)

The AB in this case reaffirmed the case law established in EC—
Bed Linen which defined dumping in terms of a “product . . . as a
whole,” not narrowly for “a product type, model, or category of
that product.”56 The AB rejected the U.S. zeroing methodology by
denying its calculative selectiveness embedded in zeroing. In its
view, “the results of the multiple comparisons at the sub-group
level” are “only intermediate calculations,” not the dumping
margin for the purpose of the WTO Antidumping Code.57 The
logical conclusion is that an anti-dumping authority should
“aggregate” all of these intermediate calculations regardless of
being plus or minus.58 Because zeroing basically cherry-picks only
Id. ¶ 53 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 55.
54 Id.
55 Id. ¶ 59.
56 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶¶ 95-96, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004),
[hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber].
57 Id. ¶ 97.
58 Id. Those who do not recognize this essential principle of “aggregation”
argue that the negation of zeroing would be tantamount to a situation in which “a
driver should not be found guilty of speeding if, along other portions of the road,
he was driving under the speed limit.” Alford, supra note 23, at 208 (quoting
Stewart, supra note 48, at 1540). Yet this is a flawed analogy. Any individual
52
53
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positive results of these intermediate calculations in the situation of
multiple comparisons and disregards (zeroes) negative ones, it
does “not take into account the entirety of the prices of some export
transactions” and thus “inflates the margin of dumping for the
product as a whole.”59
2.3.2.

The Expansion

2.3.2.1.

U.S. – Zeroing (EC) (2006)

Mirroring the EC’s earlier position in the EC—Bed Linen, the
United States argued that the dumping margin “can be interpreted
as applying on a transaction-specific basis.”60 However, in line
with the previous case law in EC—Bed Linen and U.S.—Softwood
Lumber V, the AB rejected this argument by reconfirming that the
dumping margin should be established “for each known exporter
or producer concerned of the product under investigation,” as
stipulated in Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.61
The AB viewed that such interpretation would be consistent with
the goal of an anti-dumping regime which is “designed to
counteract the foreign producer’s or exporter’s pricing
behaviour.”62
In particular, the AB ruled that zeroing was also illegal in the
“administrative review” process, in addition to the original
investigation process. Administrative review processes occur
upon request by interested parties. The process is carried out by
an antidumping authority (“DOC”), which performs an annual
calculation of antidumping duties owed by each importer by
comparing the price of each export transaction with a monthly
average nominal value.63 The DOC then aggregates the results of

incidence of speed-driving is an independent infringement, while an individual
computation outcome between normal value and export price in a single
transaction is mere an intermediate step to reaching a dumping margin. A
dumping margin presupposes a process of combination or aggregation if there are
multiple transactions under investigations.
59 U.S. – Softwood Lumber, at ¶¶ 98, 101 (emphasis in original).
60 Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations, and Methodology
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶128, WT/DS294/AB/R (May 14,
2006) [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (EC)].
61 Id.
62 Id. ¶ 129.
63 Id. ¶ 109.
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these comparisons and calculates the rate for each importer as a
percentage of her total imports in the United States.64 The AB
opined that the DOC’s “systematic” disregard of negative
individual dumping margins before aggregating these individual
dumping margins resulted in an increased rate of dumping for the
importer. The AB ruled that such systematic disregard violated
Article 9.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and GATT Article
VI:2, both of which stipulate that an anti-dumping duty shall not
exceed a dumping margin.
The AB based its decision strictly on textual grounds and
justified it from the standpoint of “customary rules of
interpretation of public international law” under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties.65 The AB possibly wanted
to deflect the potential criticism of judicial activism in relation to
Article 17.6(ii) through this ostensibly literal interpretation.
Rejecting zeroing through pure construction would have engulfed
the AB with heavier attacks than it has invited under the current
interpretation.
Interestingly, the AB opened a window for future “as such”
complaints against zeroing by endorsing the panel’s finding that
zeroing “does have general and prospective application.”66
2.3.2.2.

U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada)
(2006)

The United States challenged the AB’s emphasis on “multiple
comparisons” on which the AB based its prohibition of zeroing.
The United States argued that the AB’s position would render
“illusionary” the United States “right to choose” different methods
in calculating dumping margins.67 According to the United States,
WTO members can elect not to aggregate multiple comparisons. In
particular, the United States plausibly argued under Article 2.4.2 of
the WTO Antidumping Agreement that the AB’s “product as a
whole” approach in the previous cases would not make sense in a
“targeted dumping” scenario under the Article (a “pattern of
Id.
Id. ¶ 134.
66 Id. ¶ 204 (emphasis added).
67 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on
Softwood Lumber from Canada: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 34,
WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber (Article
21.5)].
64
65
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export prices which differ significantly among different
purchasers, regions or time periods”) because two different
dumping margins would occur for the same product, that is, “one
margin of dumping for transactions falling within the specified
pricing pattern and another for all other transactions.”68 Moreover,
without zeroing, Article 2.4.2 would be meaningless since two
different methodologies—i.e., the “weighted average-totransaction comparison” for a targeted dumping, and the
“weighted average-to-weighted average comparison” for normal
scenarios—would produce “mathematically equivalent” results.69
However, the AB blatantly dismissed the United States’
arguments. It viewed them as a “non-tested hypothesis” since the
United States “has never applied” the weighted average-totransaction methodology under the second sentence of the Article
(targeted dumping), “nor has it provided examples of how other
WTO Members have applied this methodology.”70 In addition,
according to the AB the “mathematically equivalen[t]” outcome
would be at best “limited to a specific set of circumstances.”71
Having condemned the zeroing practice under the
aforementioned hypothetical scenario (the weighted average-totransaction comparison in a targeted dumping), the AB further
moved to strike down zeroing in yet another comparison
methodology under Article 2.4, namely, a “transaction-totransaction” comparison for the same reasons on which it based its
previous rulings as to zeroing. It held that “the use of zeroing
under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology is
difficult to reconcile with the notions of impartiality, evenhandedness, and lack of bias reflected in the ‘fair comparison’
requirement in Article 2.4” because it “distorts” certain export
transactions (in that they are eventually zeroed) and consequently
inflates dumping margins.72

Id. ¶ 36.
Id.
70 Id. ¶ 97.
71 Id. ¶ 99.
72 Id. ¶¶ 138-40. Furthermore, the AB noted that the unfair effects of zeroing
tend to be more serious in the transaction-to-transaction comparison than in the
weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison because in the latter situation
zeroing is performed after individual transactions were grouped and averaged,
while in the former situation “excludes ab initio the results of all the comparisons
in which the export prices are above normal value.” Id. ¶ 141.
68
69
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The Solidification

2.3.3.1.

U.S. – Zeroing (Japan) (2007)

The AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence reached its climax in this
case. The decision, which was dubbed the “death knell of
zeroing,”73 has thus far been the most sweeping and unyielding
zeroing decisions in the WTO. The AB struck down the U.S. use of
the zeroing methodology as such in a transaction-to-transaction
(“T-T”) comparison as well as in a weighted average-to-transaction
(“W-T”) comparison. It also illegalized zeroing under three types
of administrative review (periodic review, new shipper review,
and sunset review) both as such and as applied. The United States
repeated its previous defense that the zeroing issue must be
addressed “separately for each comparison methodology and for
each type of anti-dumping proceeding”74 so that an anti-dumping
authority can enjoy the maximum discretion in its methodological
choice among different types of comparisons.75
Markedly, in addition to its previously seen recourse to textual
grounds76 and practical damages to exporters due to the inflation
of dumping rates,77 the AB rejected the U.S. argument from a
rather teleological standpoint, taking into account one of the most
paramount values of the global trading system, certainty and
predictability. It held that:
126. If it is permissible to determine a separate margin of
dumping for each transaction, the consequence would be
that several margins of dumping could be found to exist for
each known exporter or foreign producer. The larger the
number of export transactions, the greater the number of
such transaction-specific margins of dumping for each
exporter or foreign producer. This would create uncertainty
and divergences in determinations to be made in original
73 Daniel Pruzin, Dumping: Latest WTO Ruling May Spell End of U.S. Use of
Zeroing Methodology, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 83, 83 (2007) (quoting Brendan
McGivern).
74 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and
Sunset Reviews, ¶ 87, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. —Zeroing
(Japan)].
75 Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.
76 Id. ¶ 115.
77 Id. ¶ 123.
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investigations and subsequent stages of anti-dumping
proceedings.78
As the culmination of a series of anti-zeroing decisions for the
last several years, this ruling’s disciplinary range is quite broad,
covering nearly all comparison methodologies not only in the
original investigation but also in the different administrative
review procedures. This ruling seems to have delivered a clear
message to the global trading community that the era of zeroing is
gone.
2.3.3.2

U.S. —Zeroing (Mexico) (2008)

In a shocking move, the panel in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)
explicitly defied the AB’s established anti-zeroing position and
instead reverted to the findings of panels in U.S.—Zeroing (EC) and
U.S.—Zeroing (Japan) which had upheld the “simple zeroing” in the
administrative (periodic) review.79 The panel in U.S.—Zeroing
(Mexico) emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking, bound
by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that have addressed
the same issue.”80 Interestingly, it found support for its position in
Article 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)
which prohibits the panel and the AB from adding to or
diminishing WTO members’ rights and obligations.81 It also
claimed that its reversal of the AB’s position in this issue was in
pursuit of its obligation of an “objective examination” under
Article 11 of the DSU.
The AB, as had widely been predicted, reversed the panel’s
findings on the United States’ simple zeroing practice and
invalidated this methodology both “as such” and “as applied.”82
Id. ¶ 126 (emphasis added).
Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel
from Mexico, ¶¶ 7.106, 7.115, WT/DS344/R, (Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Panel
Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)]. A “simple zeroing” refers to the zeroing practice
adopted under W-T or T-T comparisons between export price and normal value.
The simple zeroing is often conducted in the administrative (periodic) review,
which starts after a year from the publication of antidumping duties. In contrast,
the zeroing practice under weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparisons is
called a “model zeroing.”
80 Id. ¶ 7.102.
81 Id.
82 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 133, 129, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)].
78
79
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The AB rejected the panel’s premise that there can be multiple
dumping margins, and emphasized that dumping (and dumping
margin) is an export-specific concept which should be defined in
terms of a product as a whole, based on the textual interpretation of
GATT Articles VI:1, VI:2 and VI:6(a) as well as WTO AntiDumping Code Articles 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, and 5.1.83 The AB also justified
its position by the “context” found in various other related
provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, such as Articles
5.2(ii), 5.8, 6.1.1, 6.7, 6.10, 8.1, 8.2, 9.4, 9.5 and 11.84 Interestingly,
the AB confirmed that both French and Spanish versions of Article
6.10 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code represent one single
dumping margin (“une marge” and “el margen,” respectively).85
Finally, the AB expressed its deep concern over the panel’s
rebellious behavior.86
2.3.3.3.

U.S.—Continued Zeroing (2009)

In this decision, the AB delivered a coup de grâce to the zeroing
methodology in its entirety. Regarding the “continued use of the
zeroing methodology in successive proceedings” as measures, the
AB sent an unequivocal signal that the simple zeroing, which the
United States had continued to use in the periodic and subsequent
reviews in defiance of the previous AB decisions, was illegal.87 The
AB’s position was particularly definite in that it captured even the
aforementioned “ongoing conduct” as a reviewable measure.88 In
a rare Concurring Opinion, a member of the AB warned future
panels not to further disobey the AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence
by relying on rulings of the previous defiant panels (“pick[ing]
over the entrails of battles past”).89
In a similar tenor, the AB ruled firmly against the United
States’ recurring claim that the panel violated the standard of
review under Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement. The
AB’s hermeneutics was basically teleological in this ruling. The AB
Id. ¶¶ 83–86.
Id. ¶¶ 87–93.
85 Id. ¶ 88 n.200.
86 Id. ¶ 162.
87 Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 185, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S.—Continued Zeroing].
88 Id. ¶ 181.
89 Id. ¶ 312.
83
84
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rejected the AB’s self-serving construction of the term
“permissible” by highlighting that “multiple meanings of a word
or term [do not] automatically constitute ‘permissible’
interpretations within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).”90 For the
purpose of a “harmonious and coherent” interpretation, the AB
prioritized the first sentence of Article 17.6(ii), which provides the
law of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, over the second sentence, which endorses
“permissible” interpretations.91
Under the AB’s “holistic”
interpretation, the first sentence informs the second one, not vice
versa.92 In other words, the critical role of “object and purpose” of
a treaty in clarifying textual ambiguities, which is enshrined in the
first sentence, should eventually “narrow the range of
interpretations” under the second sentence.93
3.

INTERPRETING THE REVOLUTION: TOWARD GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

3.1. Putting the Zeroing Jurisprudence in Constitutional Perspective
3.1.1.

Constitutional Adjudication as Constitutional Lawmaking

Capturing the constitutionality of the WTO’s new
jurisprudence on zeroing involves “a dialogue of imagination and
possibility” in that it produces a new way (theory) of observing
this particular reality (zeroing).94 It is a daunting challenge since
the terminology (constitution) is innately elusive and resistant to
any fixed meaning.95 A recently emerging wide spectrum of
narratives on trade constitution96 appears both useful and
Id. ¶ 268.
Id. ¶¶ 268–272.
92 Id.
93 Id. ¶ 273.
94 Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 645
(2006) [hereinafter Trachtman, Constitutions].
95 Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law:
Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40–41 (2001) (observing difficulties in defining
constitutionalism in the WTO context).
96 For example, Jeffrey Dunoff offered three (institutional, normative and
judicial) lenses through which one could capture trade constitution. Dunoff
located an “institutional” lens in John Jackson’s classical framework of the
multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO) under which a constitutional
90
91
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distracting. While these narratives may provide us with helpful
cognitive frameworks by which we can re-formulate the AB’s
zeroing rulings on a more solid ground, various taxonomies and
perspectives which attempt to define trade constitution on their
own terms often complicate a coherent understanding of this tricky
notion. Nonetheless, certain critical elements, such as the subject
matter, the function of adjudication, and the milieu, combined tend
to characterize the nature of constitutionalism or constitutionality
within the WTO for the purpose of this Article.
First, constitutional adjudication basically addresses the
“governance” issue. As it is related to the WTO’s telos of antiprotectionism, constitutional adjudication “enable[s] its members
to pursue common goals without being defeated by competing
antisocial conduct of members of the group.”97 In other words, it
aims to discipline parochial protectionism which undermines the
multilateral trading system, i.e., legal disciplines over protectionist
politics.98 Therefore, the purpose of constitutional adjudication
goes beyond a mere settling of a bilateral trade dispute before the
WTO court: it aims to establish a general rule which other WTO
members, not just parties concerned, will also observe in the
future.
Second, constitutional adjudication concerns the WTO court’s
(the AB’s) deliberate departure from the conventional role of a
transformation from a “power-oriented” regime to a “rule-oriented” system
occurred through a development (evolution) of institution, i.e., the “structure and
machinery” of an organization. Dunoff also discovered a “normative” lens in
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s thesis which views the WTO’s constitutionalism as precommitments on fundamental values, such as market freedom or nondiscrimination. According to Petersmann, WTO constitutionalism effectively
disciplines national policies “which tend to limit economic freedom to domestic
citizens and, for centuries, have discriminated against foreign goods, foreign
services and foreign consumers.” Finally, Dunoff unearthed a “judicial” (or
“jurisprudential”) lens of trade constitution in Deborah Cass’ thesis which focuses
on certain constitutional principles which the WTO tribunal has increasingly
invoked in shaping its decisions. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The
WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647,
651–56 (2006).
97 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 788 (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT].
98 See Dunoff, supra note 96, at 649 (“[W]e can understand the turn to
constitutionalism as a mechanism for withdrawing controversial and potentially
destabilizing issues from the parry and thrust of ordinary politics.”); see also
Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23
YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316–24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional
view of international trade law).
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triadic arbiter whose main mission is “neutral rule applier.”99 It
self-licenses to engage in “creative forms of judicial law-making”
in order to “giv[e] effect to the trade regime’s primary purpose.”100
In this regard, Deborah Cass argues that the AB has adopted a
unique
interpretive
technique
(“constitutional
doctrine
amalgamation”) which borrows from other constitutional domains
certain general, interstitial constitutional principles, such as rule of
reason or proportionality.101 Therefore, constitutional adjudication
eventually associates itself with broader and deeper issues, such as
“how to design a fair system of law.”102
Finally, a certain set of developments fashioning the
environment of the AB’s critical adjudication may help illustrate an
institutional self of the WTO. Topical controversies and debates
over the AB’s adjudication offer rich narratives in the WTO which
attempt to “constitute,” on their own terms, desirable institutional
paradigms re-configuring the subtle power allocation between the
WTO and its members. In sum, a proper constellation of
interrelated factors, such as the AB’s hermeneutical shift, a
legislative proposal to codify the shift, and a counter-proposal to
reverse the shift, tends to provide a unique constitutional moment
within the WTO which facilitates the advent of constitutional
adjudication.
Admittedly, the very invocation of “constitution” in the WTO
context itself may be provoking.103 After all, the WTO has “no
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, [and] no
constitutional drafting process.”104 Nonetheless, any direct, unnuanced domestic analogy derived from the image of the
Constitution may be ill-suited in the WTO context. Despite social
contexts and institutional paraphernalia that are different from
those of states, the WTO may still retain certain “constitutional
99 Cf. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 492
(2005) (noting that the WTO panels and Appellate Body aid their decision making
by applying the rules and canons of treaty interpretation used by other
international tribunals).
100 Id.
101 Cass, supra note 95, at 51, 67.
102 Id. at 52.
103 See id. at 40 (“In public lectures, John Jackson recalls the time when his use
of the term among trade policy officials caused some consternation and
criticism.”) (citing John H. Jackson, Lecture, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Boston, Nov. 3, 1999).
104 Dunoff, supra note 96, at 650.
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features” to the extent that governance or power allocation
between the WTO and its members still matters.105 In other words,
the WTO’s institutional arrangement, being different from that of
states, should not thwart otherwise useful constitutional
imaginations within the context of the WTO.
In this regard, constitutional discourse in international trade
law should involve various dynamic and flexible developments
which may “proceed along a number of dimensions, and in a
number of different institutional settings,” rather than “advance a
particular constitutional structure or agenda.”106 This “plasticity”
of trade constitution enables WTO Members to willingly respond
to certain constitutional moments with adequate institutional
changes.107
In this line, one possible dimension of trade
constitution, inter alia, which this article concerns, may be defined
as “a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules . . . for
determining supremacy and the scope of judicial application of
rules.”108
3.1.2.

Why Global Constitutional Lawmaking in the WTO?

On the surface, the AB’s hermeneutical shift in zeroing does
not appear inevitable. The AB could still have been faithful to the
literal ambiguities of the Antidumping Agreement as to zeroing
and thus endorsed it under Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping
Agreement in the same fashion followed by the 1995 GATT panel.
Here, the role of the AB would have been an ordinary settler of
trade disputes and there would have been nothing peculiar.
Furthermore, the hermeneutical shift as it happened might have
been deemed unspectacular as well: it might just have been yet
another change of interpretation. While it is true that the AB
employed a teleological interpretation to overcome a possible
textual interpretation that might have validated zeroing under
Article 17.6(ii),109 such a teleological shift itself does not necessarily
105 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note 94, at 625; cf. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The
Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 177, 189 n.38 (2002)
(observing that the Appellate Body has a “constitutional” nature or dimension in
that it interprets a “constituent document”).
106 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note 94, at 645 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 645.
108 Id. at 624.
109 Regarding the AB’s refusal to publicly announce that it conducted
teleological interpretation, see Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International
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deserve the label of “constitutional” adjudication. After all, neither
all interpretive changes nor all teleological interpretations should
necessarily be constitutional. However, it is not the interpretive
shift itself but the nature of the shift that should draw our attention
to this issue. Both the subject matter (zeroing) and its unique
topicality tend to define the unique, constitutional quality of the
AB’s hermeneutical shift.
Crucially, one cannot fully capture the significance of AB’s
hermeneutical turn without taking into account the current
developments in anti-dumping measures and implications zeroing
has for those developments. Since the launch of the WTO in 1995,
members have thus far initiated about 3,427 anti-dumping
investigations, while GATT contracting parties conducted only
1,600 investigations by the 1980s.110 What is more problematic is
that while developed countries such as the United States and EU
nations were historically the primary users of anti-dumping
measures in the past, developing countries have recently begun to
seek recourse in these trade remedies on a frequent basis.111 In
Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its
Fragmentation, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 952 (2004) (“In considering the relationship
between WTO Agreements and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),
one must recognize that decisions of the panels or Appellate Body of the WTO do
not make pronouncements in a direct fashion.”). In the same context, the AB
refused to acknowledge its teleological hermeneutical shift from permitting
zeroing to abandoning it. Instead, it simply disconnected from the old GATT
jurisprudence in this matter based on narrow, formalistic, textual differences
between the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and the current WTO
Antidumping Code, and thus eliminated any need to disclose the teleological root
of its anti-zeroing decision. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 132, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30,
2008) (“[T]he relevance of these panel reports [under the Tokyo Round AntiDumping Code] is diminished by the fact that the plurilateral Tokyo Round AntiDumping Code was legally separate from the GATT 1947 and has, in any event,
been terminated.”). Nonetheless, one could reasonably submit that panel reports
under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code constitute the GATT acquis. See
Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by the United States, ¶ 7.26, WT/DS27/R/USA,
(May 22, 1997) (upholding a certain practice of panels under the Tokyo Round
Anti-Dumping Code); Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997) ¶ 22 (supporting conclusions
expressed by panels under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code).
110 Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Secretariat Reports
Increase in New Anti-Dumping Investigations (May 7, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm.
111 See id. (noting that developing countries have been reporting a high
number of initiations, including India and Brazil).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

646

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:3

particular, this proliferation of anti-dumping measures is
devastating to poor countries whose economic growth is critically
linked to access to rich countries’ markets. Even if the current,
staggering Doha round trade talks were to live up to their
sobriquet (“development round”) by generously allowing poor
countries duty and quota-free market access, rich countries could
always impose extra hidden tariffs on poor countries’ main
exports, such as shoes, clothes, and catfish, in the name of
remedying foreign producers’ alleged dumping practice.112 These
anti-dumping measures tend to effectively neutralize any
previously enhanced market access borne to poor countries based
on their comparative advantages.113 At this juncture, it is worth
reiterating the fact that zeroing facilitates the progress of these
damaging events by inflating dumping margins up to around
90%.114
Against this alarming background, the AB has issued a series of
zeroing decisions. In a total of six decisions since 2001, the AB has
rendered a coherent and unwavering line of jurisprudence that
unequivocally rejects this problematic practice.
It is this
112 See Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 315, 338–41 (2005) (describing the imposition of additional duties by the U.S.
on Vietnamese catfish); Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative
Barriers as an Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395, 400 (2007)
(“Even if rich countries grant poor countries duty and quota-free market access in
the Doha negotiation, the former can always impose prohibitively high tariffs on
the latter’s clothing or shoes on the ground that the latter dump these products in
the former’s markets.”).
113 This developmentally fatal effect of rich countries’ anti-dumping
measures is well corroborated by trade statistics. For the last decade, the world’s
richest countries’ anti-dumping measures have aimed primarily at low-income
developing countries. Since the launch of the WTO, the United States has
initiated a total of 366 antidumping investigations, 215 of which have targeted
low-income developing countries. WTO AD Website, supra note 12. The EU
follows the United States in this regard. During the same period, the EU initiated
345 antidumping investigations in total, 237 of which were directed to low-income
developing countries. Unsurprisingly, most of these antidumping initiations have
concentrated on primary commodities and labor-intensive manufacturing goods
on which developing countries hold the main comparative advantages vis-à-vis
developed countries. If left unchecked, this developmentally fatal trend might
endure as the share of manufacturing products in developing countries’ gross
exports increases in the future. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Realizing
the Development Promise of Doha Agenda 2004 (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext
.pdf (describing graphs that indicate that gross exports are steadily increasing and
could continue to do so in the coming years).
114 Ikenson, supra note 16.
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resoluteness that distinguishes the AB’s teleological exegesis from
an otherwise mere interpretive methodology. Silhouetted against
the aforementioned topicality of zeroing, the judicial rulemaking
on zeroing was the AB’s purposeful mission of institutionalizing a
“proper test”115 which would shrink the domestic government’s
administrative discretion and thus render a pro-zeroing
interpretation “impermissible” under Article 17.6(ii) in this
particular anti-dumping issue. In doing so, the AB activated a
fundamental normative force field which would govern the
behaviors of all members, not only those who were direct parties of
the dispute, in a way that would herald a new policy in the zeroing
field. It is fundamental in the sense that zeroing undermines the
very telos of the WTO (free trade) and defies the very identity of
the WTO as a trade organization.
This constitutional adjudication is inextricably linked to a
string of developments that, in combination, may signify a certain
“constitutional moment” in the WTO. What the AB struck down in
its first zeroing decision (EC—Bed Linen) in 2001 concerned only a
specific type of zeroing (zeroing in a weighted-average-toweighted-average comparison). However, a group of seventeen
WTO members states collectively coined “Friends of Antidumping,” seized this moment to propose the prohibition of
zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003.116
The Friends of Anti-dumping proposal was vindicated by the AB’s
subsequent across-the-board invalidation of zeroing.117 However,
the United States, the only defendant that has lost all zeroing cases,
115 Cf. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 203–
04 (1985) (arguing that most of the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts have been
directed toward preliminary matters such as determining the proper test to apply
to the case, rather than “actual resolution of cases at hand,” which “reflects and
enhances a perspective that is regulatory, abstract, and adversarial”).
116 Proposal on Prohibition of Zeroing, Paper from Brazil; Chile; Columbia; Costa
Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzerland and Thailand,
TN/RL/W/113 (Jun. 6, 2003) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing Proposal]:

Amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that regardless of the basis of
the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted averageto-weighted-average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted averageto-transaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of
dumping found on imports from an exporter or producer of the product
subject to investigation or review must be added up.
117 See supra Section 2.3.3. (establishing that there ought to be a prohibition on
zeroing in the calculation of dumping margins).
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proposed to reinstate the zeroing practice via amendment.118 On
November 30, 2007, the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules
circulated the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements,” which attempted to reach a compromise
between the AB jurisprudence and the U.S. proposal, but
dissatisfied both sides.119 In sum, those tensions and controversies
engendered by the AB’s zeroing decisions are a testimonial to a
constitutional moment as far as zeroing is concerned in that they,
together with the AB’s constitutional adjudication, tend to shape
the contours of an institutional identity of the WTO as an
international organization that upholds free trade.
The AB has presented a “constitutional question” and
promulgated an answer in response to recent anti-zeroing
decisions, i.e., how we should understand and construct the WTO
in the face of members’ policy options which could potentially
compromise the very goal of the organization. Here, the AB chose
a different interpretive path from the old GATT panel, thereby
breathing a new life into the same old texts, such as “a fair
comparison between the export price and the domestic price”120
and “the amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the
margin of dumping.”121 This critical choice was based on the AB’s
firm understanding of the immediate and powerful normative
118 See Communication from the United States, United States—Laws,
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 29,
WT/DS294/16 [hereinafter The U.S. May 2006 Communication] (May 17, 2006)
(explaining the United States’ proposal to reinstate the zeroing practice in
opposition to the “Friends of Anti-dumping”); Proposal from the United States on
Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons, TN/RL/GEN/147, Jun. 27, 2007 [hereinafter
The U.S. June 2007 Proposal].
119 Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter WTO AD Draft].
Regarding reactions to the Draft Texts, see the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Joint Statement by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative and the Department of Commerce’s International Trade
Administration, Nov. 30, 2007 (stating that the U.S. was “very disappointed with
important aspects of this draft text”); WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Statement
on “Zeroing” in the Anti-Dumping Negotiations, Statement of Brazil; Chile; China;
Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Korea, Rep. of;
Mexico; Norway; Pakistan; Singapore; South Africa; Switzerland; Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Thailand; and Vietnam,
TN/RL/W/214/Rev.3 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing Statement]
(emphasizing that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating dumping margins
risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization efforts.”) .
120 AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.4.
121 Id. at art. 9.3.
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consequences that its adjudication would bring in the future WTO.
To wit, the AB was well aware that its adjudication would
“constitute” the WTO, at least as far as the zeroing issue is
concerned. This is why the nature of the AB’s hermeneutical shift
on zeroing might be coined constitutional.
One important caveat is in order: constitutional adjudication,
which is theorized in this Article, is entirely subject matter-specific
as it exclusively refers to the zeroing practice. Therefore, the
constitutional adjudication addressed here should not be unduly
generalized and expanded to other WTO issues. Importantly,
constitutional adjudication on zeroing does not fossilize in general
Article 17.6(ii), which may still provide ample deference to
domestic antidumping authorities on other anti-dumping issues.
Moreover, constitutional adjudication might not make sense in
non-antidumping contexts; and even if it does, it could feature
entirely different patterns from what is described in this context.
For example, if the AB were to adjudicate another important
regulatory issue of reconciling trade value and non-trade value
(legitimate policy objectives), such as the protection of public
health and the environment, its judicial rulemaking in these areas
would be aptly characterized as different types of constitutional
adjudication.122
3.2. Normative Ramifications of Global Constitutional Lawmaking
3.2.1.

Could WTO Members Overturn Constitutional
Lawmaking?

After losing a series of zeroing cases under the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, the United States proposed that zeroing be
ultimately resolved through negotiations, instead of being left to
adjudication.123
Naturally, the United States suggested that
122 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A
REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003) (noting that the AB has
“decided on a case by basis whether a given domestic regulation was applied
consistently or whether it respected due process, rather than reinvestigating . . .
whether the substance of the regulation itself is necessary”).
123 See Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped
Comparisons, TN/RL/W/208 (Jun. 5, 2007) at 2 [hereinafter The U.S. June 2007
Communication] (noting that the United States’ view of the “proper resolutions to
the issue requires clear text providing that the margins of dumping may be
determined without offsets for non-dumped transactions consistent with the longheld concept of dumping”).
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relevant provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, such as
Articles 2.4 and 9.3, be amended in a way that explicitly endorses
zeroing.124 The United States drive for negotiation prompted the
Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, the Uruguayan
Ambassador Guillermo Valles Games, to circulate on November
30, 2007 the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM
Agreements,” which “[he] believe[d] could facilitate the
negotiation of a balanced outcome.”125
The Chair’s draft text on zeroing appears to be a compromise
between the current WTO case law and the U.S. proposal. While
the text prohibits zeroing in “multiple comparisons of a weighted
average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all
comparable export transactions,” it permits zeroing “on a
transaction-to-transaction basis or of multiple comparisons of
individual export transactions to a weighted average normal
value” as well as in case of administrative reviews.126 A large
group of countries opposing zeroing criticized the text. They
emphasized that zeroing is a “biased” method for calculating
dumping margins risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade
liberalization efforts.”127 The Chair subsequently conceded that
there simply existed “no hints on possible middle ground
approaches nor suggestions for possible compromises or tradeoffs.”128
Considering these diametrically opposite views on zeroing
among major WTO members as well as the inchoate stage of WTO
negotiations regarding this controversial issue, any pro-zeroing
amendment to the Antidumping Agreement is highly unlikely, at
least in the near future.129 Nonetheless, if such an amendment

124 The United States proposed adding the following paragraph: “Authorities
are not required to offset the results of any comparison in which the export price
is greater than the normal value against the results of any comparison in which
the normal value is greater than the export price.” The United States May 2006
Communication, supra note 118; The U.S. June 2007 Proposal, supra note 118.
125 WTO AD Draft, supra note 119.
126 Id.
127 The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note 119.
128 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman,
TN/RL/W/232, at 1, A-10, A-11 (May 28, 2008).
129 See Jonathan Lynn, Anti-Dumping Row Roils WTO, Isolates U.S., REUTERS,
Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1044224620080110 (quoting
Brenden McGivern who observed that “it’s wildly optimistic of the U.S. to think
they’ll get this back through negotiations”).
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should ever transpire, would it trump the outcome of the AB’s
constitutional adjudication (constitutional jurisprudence)?
Purely from a normative standpoint, one might argue that it
should not. According to this position, since constitutional
jurisprudence on zeroing directly addresses the most essential
value (telos) of the WTO system, such as anti-protectionism, even
an amendment of WTO norms should not repeal this fundamental
norm.130
This preemptive, per se invalid position tends to
distinguish constitutional jurisprudence from other WTO case law
concerning more mundane trade disputes whose outcome may be
altered by subsequent negotiations.
However, this position appears not only infeasible but also
illogical. The existence of one constitutional norm (anti-zeroing
jurisprudence) should not unduly block any future constitutional
dynamics under the WTO. One might logically envision a
situation in which WTO members might need to modify, if not
repeal, even this jurisprudence via a constitutional amendment,
such as a revision of the WTO Charter and/or the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. Nevertheless, WTO members must not
entertain any lax overriding of such paramount constitutional
jurisprudence. An example would be repealing the constitutional
jurisprudence through a soft norm, such as a decision or a
declaration by Ministers131 simply as a result of mundane
bargaining in the trade negotiation, as is currently conducted in the
Negotiating Group on Rules.132 This lower threshold in nullifying
constitutional norms risks over-politicizing the WTO’s normative
operation in this important area.133 In this sense, the legal status of
130 See The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note 119 (observing that the
countries involved in drafting this statement seek to reduce protectionism).
131 See Mary E. Footer, The Role of ‘Soft’ Law Norms in Reconciling the
Antinomies of WTO Law (July 14, 2008), SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
INAUGURAL CONFERENCE 12–13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159929
(observing that soft norms, such as a “decision,” are subject to a hardening process,
such as an “amendment”). According to Footer, it is conceivable that a decision
remains unamended. Id.
132 Currently, most WTO members approach this issue not even through
“negotiation” but rather merely as “discussion.” Lamy Urges “Maximum Effort” for
July Meeting of Ministers, WTO: 2008 NEWS ITEMS, Jun. 27, 2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_stat_june08_e.htm.
133 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in
GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39 (1999) (warning that frequent constitutional
amendments might be used as “a chip in short-run political games”).
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anti-zeroing jurisprudence might be analogous to a strong version
of the U.S. “constitutional common law,” which survives an
ordinary legislative challenge yet is still subject to a subsequent
constitutional amendment.134 In other words, procedural rigors
built into Article X (Amendment) of the WTO Agreement,
including a super majority rule,135 must govern any modification of
the zeroing jurisprudence. A simple decision or declaration
engineered by a negotiation must not immediately overturn it
without a formal amendment. On the contrary, under an ideal
scenario, WTO members should “codify” the outcome of
constitutional adjudication, i.e., the AB’s anti-zeroing case law.136
3.2.2.

Could a Lower Tribunal (Panel) Reject Constitutional
Lawmaking?

Despite the well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence, the
recent panel in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) explicitly rejected the AB’s
positions—in particular those in U.S.—Zeroing (EC) and U.S.—
134 A strong version of constitutional common law, which I analogize here,
refers to certain constitutional rules that are “elaborated by judges through
precedent-based reasoning” and “not defensible by ordinary legislation.” See
generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1996) (considering whether common law constitutional interpretation
gives judges too much power and whether this is appropriate in a democracy).
See also Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common
Law at 1 n.2 (Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 73). In contrast,
a soft version of constitutional common law envisions being overturned by
legislation. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
135 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. X, paras. 1 and 3 (“Amendments to
provisions of this Agreement, or of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes
1A and 1C, other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6, of a nature that would
alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members
that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and
thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it.”).
136 A group of countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong
Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Singapore, Switzerland and
Thailand, collectively called the “Friends of Antidumping,” proposed a
prohibition of zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003.
They proposed an amendment of “[A]rticle 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that
regardless of the basis of the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e.
weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted
average-to-transaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of
dumping found on imports from an exporter or producer of the product subject to
investigation or review must be added up.” The Anti-Zeroing Proposal, supra
note 117.
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Zeroing (Japan)—and instead followed the line of reasoning that
two previous panels had employed in these cases.137 These cases
concerned, inter alia, a “simple zeroing” in the administrative
(periodic) review.138 Although the U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) panel
admitted that the AB “de facto expects” the panel to respect
adopted AB reports “to the extent that the legal issues are
similar,”139 it emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking,
bound by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that have
addressed the same issue.”140 However, as long as constitutional
adjudication in this matter is presumed, the panel’s stance is
unacceptable for the following reasons.
First, the panel overstated the degree to which it is not bound
by prior AB decisions.
No matter how one labels WTO
jurisprudence, the label itself has never actually bestowed
compliance pull upon those decisions.141 Regardless of the label,
Members perceive these precedents as well-established
“jurisprudence” which they voluntarily observe: they cite, quote
and refer to the AB’s precedents to substantiate and reinforce their
own legal positions in the dispute. While not all Members abide
by the WTO jurisprudence all the time, such breaches do not
necessarily nullify the legal authority of the jurisprudence. In
particular—if such jurisprudence concerns constitutional issues,
such as zeroing—its compliance pull tends to be stronger than it
would be in other situations since Members fully appreciate the
normative weight of such jurisprudence. Perhaps this heightened
compliance pull can explain the EC’s swift change of course the
moment the AB struck down its own zeroing practice in 2001.142

137 Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel
from Mexico, ¶ 7.106, WT/DS344/R (Dec. 20, 2007) (“[W]e have decided that we
have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of reasoning developed
by the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-consistency of simple zeroing in
periodic reviews.”) [hereinafter U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)].
138 Id. ¶¶ 7.106, 7.115.
139 Id. ¶ 7.105.
140 Id. ¶ 7.102.
141 Cf. Fabien Gélinas, Dispute Settlement as Institutionalization in International
Trade and Information Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493 (2005) (observing
that precedential effect in the WTO does not originate strictly from “stare decisis”
but rather from a concern for “formal justice,” a concept concerned with
preserving the “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system).
142 See supra Section 2.3.
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Second, as discussed above, constitutional adjudication on
zeroing normatively prevails even over Members’ attempts to
modify its outcome through political bargaining or amendment. If
constitutional adjudication should govern Members’ behavior, it
should also regulate panels’ rulings. Otherwise, the normative
superiority flowing from constitutional adjudication would be
meaningless.
Third, the U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) panel rationalized its defiance
by invoking DSU Article 19.2, which prohibits both the panel and
the AB from “‘add[ing] to or diminish[ing]’” WTO Members’
rights and obligations.143 In other words, the panel implied that
the AB diminished the United States’ rights under the WTO norms
by judicially enacting a new proscription on zeroing. However, the
very idea of constitutional adjudication tends to prevent the panel
from making such a self-assured determination. A WTO panel, as
a lower tribunal, is not entitled to question the validity of a
constitutional decision rendered by the AB—a constitutional
tribunal. Moreover, the panel’s justification for departing from the
AB’s constitutional jurisprudence is itself groundless: the AB’s
constitutional adjudication never diminishes Members’ WTO
rights and obligations; it simply “clarifies” them from the
standpoint of a trade constitution.
Sharing the same position, the AB in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)
rightly rejected the panel’s position on this issue. It emphasized
that the fact that AB reports may not be “binding” per se does not
free panels from observing previous reports.144 The AB reiterated
its previous findings that adopted AB reports create “legitimate
expectations” among WTO Members and that panels’ observance
of those reports would also be expected.145 The AB justified its
position with a critical observation on the value of “jurisprudence”
within the WTO, which is arguably the most important dicta on
this question.
Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited
by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute
settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and
the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition,
U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 137, ¶ 7.102.
Panel Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 79, ¶ 158.
145 Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, at 14,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)).
143
144
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when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations
pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members
take into account the legal interpretation of the covered
agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate
Body reports.146
The AB did not forget to admonish the panel’s unusual
behavior. With a solemn tone, it emphasized that the panel’s
defiance is against the hierarchical division of labor in DSU under
which only the AB can “uphold, modify or reverse” panels’ legal
interpretations.147 The AB expressed its deep concern over the
panel’s rebellious behavior.148
In the most recent zeroing dispute (U.S.—Continued Zeroing),
the panel did follow the AB’s well-established anti-zeroing
jurisprudence, unlike previous panels, which had defied the AB.
Yet the panel did so only reluctantly. The panel still viewed those
decisions by defiant panels as “persuasive,”149 although it
eventually struck down the United States’ zeroing practices for the
sake of WTO jurisprudence.150 In response, a rare concurring
opinion tolled the eventual death knell for zeroing adjudication by
declaring that:
In matters of adjudication, there must be an end to every
great debate. The Appellate Body exists to clarify the
meaning of the covered agreements. On the question of
zeroing it has spoken definitively. Its decisions have been
adopted by the DSB. The membership of the WTO is
entitled to rely upon these outcomes . . . . At a point in
every debate, there comes a time when it is more important
for the system of dispute resolution to have a definitive
outcome, than further to pick over the entrails of battles
past. With respect to zeroing, that time has come.151

Id. ¶ 160.
Id. ¶ 161.
148 Id. ¶ 162.
149 Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, ¶ 251, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008).
150 Id. ¶ 257.
151 Id. ¶ 312.
146
147
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RESISTANCE TO GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

4.1. Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing
The bold jurisprudence that the AB has crafted in striking
down zeroing has invited a good deal of criticism on various
fronts.
Some contend that nowhere in the WTO and its
Antidumping Agreement texts or their legislative histories—the
Uruguay Round negotiation history—does an explicit prohibition
on this practice exist. According to these critics, the AB is,
therefore, “making up rules that the U.S. never negotiated.”152
Likewise, the U.S. government has observed that:
A prohibition of zeroing, or a requirement to provide
offsets for non-dumped transactions, simply cannot be
found in the text of the AD [Antidumping] Agreement . . . .
The issue of zeroing, on which Members could not reach
agreement in the Uruguay Round, should not be left to
dispute settlement. We as Members should endeavour [sic]
to reach an agreement on this issue through negotiation.153
In fact, Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement
provides that in times of ambiguities (when a provision “admits of
more than one permissible interpretation”) a WTO panel shall
validate a domestic anti-dumping authority’s measure “if it rests
upon one of those permissible interpretations.”154 In light of this
article, the AB’s invalidation of zeroing—which is not prohibited
under GATT Article VI or the Antidumping Agreement—might be
seen as “legislating to fill in the perceived gaps in the coverage of
the Antidumping Agreement” and thus as violating the “standard
of review contained in the Antidumping Agreement that calls for
deference to national administrators of antidumping laws.”155

152 News Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. Trade Laws and
the WTO 3 (Sept. 27, 2002), http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf.
153 Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped
Comparisons, 2, TN/RL/W/208 (June 5, 2007).
154 AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 17.6 (ii).
155 Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
417, 421 (2001). See also Alford, supra note 23, at 199–202 (concluding “that the
Appellate Body in U.S.—Zeroing circumvented the particularized standard of
review required under the Antidumping Agreement”); Greenwald, supra note 49,
at 114 (warning that “the promise of an effective international dispute settlement

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/1

2010]

GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

657

The discontent over the AB’s judicial activism is largely
focused on what some have termed “judicial legislation.”156
Judicial legislation exercised by an overzealous trade tribunal
would encroach upon member states’ regulatory autonomy in
certain policy matters that they believe have never been ceded to
international organizations like the WTO. The way in which the
DSU is written might attest to this position. Under the DSU, the
formal mission of the WTO tribunal is merely to assist the Dispute
Settlement Body (i.e., the General Council) in settling disputes
between
WTO
Members
by
delivering
mere
157
“recommendations.”
As frequently understood, these
recommendations are not permitted to add to or diminish the rights
and obligations of member states.158
Often, criticisms of the AB’s judicial activism become rather
emotional. Understandably, they originate from certain domestic
producers who compete with foreign rivals. They contend that
“‘zeroing’ is one of the sinews of U.S. anti-dumping law [and that]
the [a]bandonment of ‘zeroing’ would not be, as some have
suggested, a methodological tweak of Commerce’s dumping
methodology or a minor concession by the United States to mollify
the WTO.”159
The U.S. Congress has been quite responsive to these anxious
voices.
In a recent statute renewing the President’s trade
promotion authority (“TPA”), Congress explicitly demonstrated its
frustration over the AB’s interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) of the
system will never be realized if the WTO professionals are incapable of restraining
their impulse to legislate under the guise of ‘neutral’ dispute settlement”).
156 See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive,
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 247–48 (2004)
(observing that a wide range of commentators, such as scholars, practitioners,
politicians and NGOs have recently accused the WTO Appellate Body of judicial
activism).
157 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125, art. 19.1, at 1237 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
158 Id. arts. 3.2, 19.2. The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note 118 (“The
perception that the dispute settlement system is operating so as to add to or
diminish rights and obligations actually agreed to by Members, notwithstanding
DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2, is highly corrosive to the credibility that the dispute
settlement system has accumulated over the past 11 years.”).
159 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, JOINT STATEMENT OF AD HOC
SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE AND SOUTHERN SHRIMP ALLIANCE, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5468.
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WTO Antidumping Agreement, alleging that it deprived the U.S.
regulatory agency (the Commerce Department) of its rightful
deference secured under the article. The 2001 TPA Bill provides
that “the Congress is concerned that dispute settlement panels of
the WTO and the Appellate Body appropriately apply the standard
of review contained in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement,
to provide deference to a permissible interpretation by a WTO
member of provisions of that Agreement.”160 In December 2006 a
group of ten U.S. senators with a similar intent sent a letter to the
U.S. Trade Representative and the Commerce Department warning
that the elimination of zeroing would lead to a “dramatic
weakening of U.S. antidumping laws.”161 In light of these protests
from Congress, some commentators warn that the AB’s disregard
of the special standard of review might deter the United States’
generous trade concessions in the subsequent round of trade
negotiations.162 According to them, the AB’s judicial activism
might yield only a Pyrrhic victory for free-tradists.163
4.2. Defending Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing
4.2.1.

The Augmented Role of International Adjudication

Despite the criticism of “judicial usurpation,”164 it is widely
recognized that judges, both international and domestic, do more
than merely apply rules in a mechanical fashion. To some extent,
judicial legislation is an innate, unavoidable function of
160 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 §3801(b)(3)(B), 19
U.S.C. §§3801–13 (2006).
161 Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Zeroing Methodology Hit Again by WTO Appellate
Body, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 52, 53 (2007).
162 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Paved with Good Intentions: The Dynamic Effects of
WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Action, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 373, 374 (2003) (noting
that the United States may adjust its negotiating strategy “to take account of this
institutional usurpation of the [previous] negotiation results”); Steinberg, supra
note 156, at 261 (claiming that the AB’s failure to give weight to members’ intent
could risk “political repercussions”). But see U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE
(GAO), GAO-03-824, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
IMPACT OF TRADE REMEDY RULINGS (2003) (observing that “of the legal experts
GAO consulted, a majority concluded that the WTO has properly applied
standards of review and correctly ruled on major trade remedy issues”).
163 Tarullo, supra note 162, at 374.
164 See generally Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the
Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172 (1892) (defending judicial
legislation against its “sense of reproach”).
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adjudication.165 To deny this proposition would almost be akin to
believing a myth.166 As early as the end of the nineteenth century,
Ezra Thayer emphasized that the “growth of law” via judicial
legislation is not only “desirable” but also “necessary.”167 Two
decades later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously ruled that
when we interpret “constituent act[s],” such as the Constitution,
we must be aware that “they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
the most gifted of its begetters.”168 More recently, Martin Shapiro
observed that it would be “logically required” that any judicial
discovery involves judicial lawmaking since no pre-existing norm
completely covers future cases.169 After all, any norms—if left
unchanged—tend to become outmoded, and even anachronistic, as
they fail to respond to altered realities with the passage of time.
The necessity for judicial progressive development, or
updating, of fixated text is no less acute in the international law
arena than in the domestic legal system. In fact, the need for
judicial gap-filling may be stronger in the international law setting
since deliberate ambiguities are often written into the text as
necessary evils that allow unyielding state parties to reach a
compromise. These textual ambiguities unavoidably widen a gap
between the black letter law (past) and the cases at hand (present).
Thus, it becomes a vital mission of any (well-functioning)
international tribunal to seek “consistency that connects past,
present, and future.”170 This is the very reason why international
judges, in interpreting treaty texts, “must have regard to the
165 See Thomas M. Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International ThirdParty Decision-Making, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1220–21 (1967) (articulating the
presumption of general bias in decision making, though not placing a value
judgment on it). See also Fabien Gélinas, Dispute Resolution as Institutionalization in
International Trade and Information Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2005)
(observing a general trend of judicial legislation in the post-war era) (citing RAN
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004)).
166 See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521
(2005) (noting that “this ideal type [of non-legislating judge] accurately describes
almost no actual domestic court in existence”).
167 See Thayer, supra note 165, at 178–79.
168 Missouri v. Holland, 253 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
169 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 29
(1981).
170 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335
(1995).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

660

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:3

exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of
those who framed it.”171 In this sense, international adjudication,
even more than domestic, engages in a “dynamic” process of
judicial rulemaking, which produces jurisprudence or case law.172
The WTO tribunal is not an exception to this trend.173
171 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN,
1950 I.C.J. 4, 17–18 (Mar. 1950) (quoted in Alvarez, supra note 166, at 96).
172 See Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the
Judicialization of the Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS
AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 118, 139 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997) (arguing
that the Standing Appellate Body of the WTO engages not only in dispute
resolution but also in rulemaking and social control). Cf. David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1996)
(discussing the “prevalence and importance of nontextual amendments”); HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 155–226 (1958) (arguing that “judicial legislation” is particularly
appropriate in the international sphere, and entirely “healthy and unavoidable”);
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING:
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 168 (1986) (discussing
the “imperative principles” of a novel jus gentium); RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985) (arguing that independent judges in international
trade tribunals can develop a jus gentium free from the contingencies of the
various states). See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States
Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 899, 937 (2005) (recognizing the inevitability of gap-filling and certain
“minimal lawmaking” by independent international tribunals). Cf. Edward T.
Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492,
1510 (2004) (observing many scholars’ view that the “power of international
institutions to interpret their founding instruments is a significant source of
authority for generating new rules”).
173 See Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 848–49 (1999) (recognizing the WTO
tribunal’s rule-making role). Joel Trachtman espouses the case of judicial rulemaking in the WTO dispute settlement system because he employs the
“rules/standards” distinction and the economic approach of an “incomplete
contract.” Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note 22, at 350–55. He argues
that the WTO tribunal is “not simply a mechanism for neutral application of
legislated rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance.” Id. at
336. In a similar context, Kenneth Abbott views “legalization” as “delegation,”
meaning that third parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as
well as to resolve disputes. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). After
all, it may be optimal if an originally incomplete contract—such as the WTO
treaty—which contains not only definite rules but also more open-ended standards,
may be filled in later by a judicial organ. See also Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the
Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV.
541, 547–48 (1994) (arguing that statutes, like contracts, are often intentionally left
vague because it is too difficult to provide for all the possibilities and because
future uncertainty means that it is best to allow courts to fill in the details later
through a “quasi-legislative process”).
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The WTO’s unique institutional structure may further warrant
judicial rule making.
The WTO suffers, like many other
international organizations, basic “positivist” predicaments
stemming from the often stubborn and eccentric “wills” of states.
The difficulty of converging more than 150 wills tends to make any
legislation under the WTO extremely impracticable. Legislation in
the WTO is also compounded by its daunting decision making
mechanism—either a consensus or supermajority in any important
matter.174
Under these taxing circumstances, the WTO
jurisprudence developed by the WTO panels and the AB should be
given more weight in terms of the WTO’s nuanced institutional
balance than in terms of the Montesquiean separation of powers
notion that are better suited to the domestic context.175 After all,
this is a useful manifestation of “judicial prudentialism,”176 rather
than reckless “judicial activism.”
Critics of the AB might seize the textual semblance of Article
17.6 (ii) to the Chevron doctrine and argue that the Article is a
specific “rule” which must be directly applied, not constructed, by
the WTO tribunal in the same manner in which the Chevron
doctrine is applied in the U.S. court.177 However, if one categorizes

174 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO,
39 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (“The decision-making and voting
procedures of the WTO, although much improved over the GATT, still leave
much to be desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will proceed,
particularly given the large number of countries now or soon involved.”).
175 See Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Traditional Continued
or New Frontier?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 40 (2000) (arguing that the WTO dispute
settlement system fosters the “development of principles of international law
through judicial decisions at a much faster pace than has occurred under existing
international legal institutions”); Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism,’ Values, and
International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 301 (2000) (advocating the Appellate
Body’s “enhanced role for a self-confident judiciary, filling in the gaps which
states in their legislative capacity have been unwilling—or unable—to fill”);
Steinberg, supra note 156, at 260 (stating policy arguments for a less deferential
Appellate Body). Cf. Shimon Shetreet, Judging in Society: The Changing Role of
Courts, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY 469 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988)
(observing that “legislatures are [generally] slow to introduce law reforms to
ensure that the law adapts to changing times and changing social and moral
norms”).
176 Cf. Russell Gabriel & Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International Law, 82 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 277, 283–84 (1988) (discussing the limits of judicial discretion).
177 Regarding the distinction between “rules” and “standards,” see
Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note 22, at 350–51 (defining a rule as a law
that is specified in advance as to what conduct applies, and a standard as a
guideline without specifying the conduct required or prohibited).
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the Article as a more flexible “standard,” the WTO tribunal can
certainly fill in the gap of an incomplete treaty, i.e., the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. In fact, considering the murky nature of
negotiation history under the Uruguay Round over the antidumping issues in general,178 it would be only logical to construe
the Article as a standard whose real life applications have been
delegated to the WTO tribunal.179 According to game theory, the
purpose of this interpretive flexibility is to enhance “allocative
efficiency.”180
One could reasonably speculate that the
Antidumping Agreement would not have come to light if
disagreeing negotiators had stubbornly clung to their own original
preferences, which had been diametrically opposite.
Despite its strong merits, judicial rule making by the WTO
tribunal manifests itself in a much-nuanced fashion. As José
Alvarez observed, “[c]andid acknowledgment of judicial lawmaking . . . is a rarity in international decisions.”181 In fact, Judge
Jennings, one of the most respected ICJ judges, once wrote that
“the most important requirement of the judicial function” appears
to be applying preexisting norms even when it “creates law in the
sense of developing, adapting, modifying, filling gaps,
interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction . . . .”182 The
WTO tribunal, like any other international tribunal, is rather
reserved and circumspect in performing this inevitable judicial
function.183 This approach results from the fact that the AB is all
See Stewart, supra note 48.
See Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 22, at
351–52 (noting that a standard, as opposed to a rule, would rationally be placed in
trade agreements because of less domestic scrutiny, and the ability for both sides
to claim victory).
180 Id.
181 ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at 532.
182 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1996)
(quoting Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in
International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERTO AGO 141, 142 (1987). See ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at
532, n. 38 (quoting Judge Jennings); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple
International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law
or Its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 944 (2004) (observing that “judicial
legislation at the international level is a well recognized occurrence, albeit within
limits of judicial caution and restraint”).
183 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 25, 25 (1998) (discussing some early WTO decisions where the AB is
measured in judicial law-making). See generally, Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional
178
179
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too aware of members’ anxieties over its potential judicial activism
and the subsequent encroachment on their sovereignty. Therefore,
the AB always endeavors to avoid implications that may lead some
members to suspect that it overreaches its textually limited
mandate under DSU, i.e., not adding to or diminishing members’
rights and obligations. The AB’s well-documented preoccupation
with textual interpretation, even when it in fact adopts teleological
interpretation, attests to this caution.184
4.2.2.

The Ambiguous Nature of WTO Bargain

As discussed above, critics of the AB seem to subscribe to a
contractarian view on the multilateral trading system. They
basically view that invalidating zeroing is not what members,
especially those members which advocate zeroing, had bargained
for in the Uruguay Round negotiations.185 On the contrary, the real
deal struck in the Uruguay Round, according to them, was one that
bestowed considerable deference to domestic anti-dumping
authorities, which is allegedly enshrined in Article 17.6 (ii) of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement. Those critics appear to deem this
Article as a sacrosanct term of the Uruguay Round contract. As a
matter of fact, the Article was inserted at the eleventh hour in the
Uruguay Round negotiation at the United States’ strong behest.
No doubt the U.S. did not want the newly created, and more
“judicialized,” WTO dispute settlement mechanism to restrain the
operation of its politically sensitive domestic anti-dumping regime,
which is a critical protectionist bulwark serving politically
powerful domestic producers. To them, Article 17.6 (ii) would be a
Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 647, 658 (2006) (observing “[t]here can be little doubt that the AB’s larger,
if implicit, message—that it will not adopt or articulate a ‘constitutional’
understanding of the WTO’s institutional architecture—was widely understood”).
184 See generally Henrik Horn & Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Communities —
Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW
OF 2002 248 (H. Horn & P.C. Mavroidis eds., 2005).
See also Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal
Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (observing that the AB emphasized the textual
interpretation so as to avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights
and obligations in the WTO treaty).
185 See Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, Annex D-13, ¶ 34-36, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008) (observing
that there existed no consensus on zeroing at the time of Uruguay Round
negotiations).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

664

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:3

Trojan horse deliberately deployed in the middle of the
multilateral trading system.
However, an anachronistic, contractarian understanding of the
WTO may overstate the positivist/realist nature of the multilateral
trading system and thus fail to fully capture its true aspects.
Concededly, the prototypical construct of the post-war global
trading system was a sovereign contract dealing mostly with tariffs,
i.e., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The agreement
was negotiated, signed and implemented by “contracting” parties.
Under this originally positivist structure, both the formation and
the operation of GATT would be determined by power disparity or
the so-called “hegemony stability thesis” under which power is a
main currency.186 Perhaps this is the reason why most criticisms of
judicial activism are staged by political scientists or politicians,
whose main language is power, not norms.187
Yet, for the past half century the gravity of governance in the
global trading system has shifted from power to norms on account
of a remarkable institutional evolution that has transformed an
erstwhile contract into a “system.”188 As the former Director of the
WTO Appellate Body Secretariat Debra Steger once put appositely,
the GATT turned into “something greater than a contract that could
be withdrawn from by any contracting party whenever it found
the obligations too onerous.”189 In the same vein, the nature of the
WTO remedies is no longer obsessed with the “rebalancing” of
their original negotiated matrices of gives-and-takes, but more
attuned to norm-building.190 In sum, the WTO as a system, or a

186 See Hans J. Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky, Political Limitations of the
United Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150 (Hans J.
Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky eds., 1953) (noting that “the United Nations
[has] not replaced power politics”).
187 See, e.g., Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization,
and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 603 (2000).
188 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 763, 769-71 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Remedies].
189 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum – A
Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2002) (emphasis added). In a similar
context, it can be said that GATT evolved from an interest-driven “contract” to a
norm-based “covenant.” See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424-25 (2000) (discussing
“contracts” and “covenants” as two different ways to view international law).
190 Cho, Remedies, supra note 188, at 792–95.
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“trade constitution,”191 continuously transforms both the content of
international trade law and state actors’ behaviors192 in a way that
creates stability and predictability in the “multilateral trading
system.”193 From this perspective, the alleged term of the Uruguay
Round contract, which is raised by the U.S. in a self-serving way,
could (and should) not determine the legal destinies of measures in
question.
Even if one arguendo adheres to a contract analogy in
interpreting Article 17.6 (ii), the United States is just one party to
the contract. Its interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) must not be
representative and thus authoritative. As the AB held in LAN,
“[t]he purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the
parties” which “cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective
and unilaterally determined ‘expectations’ of one of the parties to a
treaty.”194 At the same time, “[a] proper interpretation also would
191 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 339–51 (2d ed. 1997) (characterizing the
policies of the world trading system as “trade constitution”); JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101–04 (1998)
(referring to the “broad” WTO constitution); John H. Jackson, Reflections on
International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 25–28 (1996) (referring to
the “constitutional law” of international trade organizations); John H. Jackson,
Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 873, 873
(1996); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REV. 511, 573–83 (2000). Professor Cottier also notes “[w]hile the GATT
was an agreement the purpose of which was almost exclusively the reduction of
trade barriers, the WTO increasingly assumes constitutional functions in a
globalizing economy.” Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Some
Issues and Ideas, Paper delivered at the WTO Symposium of Non-Governmental
Organizations on Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development, March 17–
18, 1998, available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/2260.pdf. Cf.
Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing
Substantive International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 129 (1996–97) (arguing
that “[t]he Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a trade structure
that no longer seeks only to deregulate or regulate in the names of some narrow
universal principle of free trade, but that seeks to regulate sovereignties for the
purpose of finding universality”).
192 See ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at 588 (arguing that international
organizations have changed and are continuing to change the international
sources of law, their substantive content, and the actors that make them, including
states themselves).
193 Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶
7.76, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
194 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of
Certain Computer Equipment, ¶84, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R,
WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5, 1998).
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have included an examination of the existence and relevance of
subsequent practice,”195 such as strong objections to the zeroing
practice expressed by other parties (to the contract), for example,
the Friends of Antidumping.196
More importantly, Article 17.6 eventually fails to deliver what
sovereigntists believe they have earned through a bargain. An
alleged semblance of the Article to the Chevron doctrine does not
necessarily accord this international norm the same doctrinal
content as the putative domestic legal doctrine. To sovereigntists’
disappointment, Steven Croley and John Jackson eloquently
demonstrated why Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement
must not be interpreted like the Chevron doctrine.197 First, an
explicit use of different languages in two situations, which are
“permissible” in Article 17.6(ii) and “reasonable” in the Chevron
doctrine, tends to oppose a similar pattern of interpretation
between the two.198 Second, as an international treaty, the
Antidumping Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with
those interpretive principles under the Vienna Convention on the
Law of the Treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32, not with the
United States’ rules of statutory construction.199 Finally, they aptly
pointed out that certain underlying rationales in the Chevron
doctrine, such as “agency expertise” and “administrative
coordination” cannot find their places in the WTO context.200
Carlos Manuel Vázquez has also echoed Croley and Jackson’s
well-situated arguments. He criticized the Chevron deference in the
context of the Antidumping Agreement. He has argued that
“Chevron deference takes place in the context of horizontal judicial
review, whereas WTO adjudication is vertical judicial review” and
that the Chevron analogy, if used to interpret Article 17.6(ii), would
be tantamount to requiring that “federal courts defer to state court
interpretations of federal law.”201 Like Croley and Jackson, he also
Id. ¶ 90.
See supra note 136.
197 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 205–06
(1996).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 206.
200 Id. at 206–11.
201 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO:
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. Rev. 587, 603 (2004)
(emphasis added).
195
196
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emphasized that the agency expertise rationale in the Chevron
doctrine is no longer valid in the WTO context. He incisively
observed that applying this doctrine to the WTO would be
tantamount to a U.S. court deferring its statutory interpretation to
those who are being regulated.202
The AB in U.S.—Continued Zeroing (2009) confirmed the futility
of the Chevron analogy. The AB ruled that:
[A] permissible interpretation for purposes of the second
sentence of Article 17.6(ii) is not the result of an inquiry that
asks whether a provision of domestic law is “necessarily
excluded” by the application of the Vienna Convention.
Such an approach subverts the hierarchy between the treaty
and municipal law. It is the proper interpretation of a
covered agreement that is the enterprise with which Article
17.6(ii) is engaged, not whether the treaty can be
interpreted consistently with a particular Member’s
municipal law or with municipal laws of Members as they
existed at the time of the conclusion of the relevant treaty.203
In conclusion, a contractarian analogy, which zeroing
advocates employ in justifying its validity, tends to oversubscribe
to a positivist understanding of the WTO and thus runs the risk of
a misguided assessment of the measure.
4.2.3.

The Enlightened Meaning of Sovereignty

A central theme revealed by critics of the AB’s anti-zeroing
jurisprudence is “sovereignty,” which carries a hallmark of the
Lotus principle.
Under the well-known principle of public
international law, sovereign states are capable of doing whatever
they desire as long as no explicit prohibition exists under
international law.204 Following this logic, WTO members would be
free to adopt the zeroing practice because the WTO Anti-Dumping
Code does not expressly ban such practice.
Yet this “disarticulated” use of sovereignty may not do justice
to the contemporary status of global market integration under the
WTO system.205 There are plausible risks that protectionists may
202
203
204
205

Id. at 604.
U.S.—Continued Zeroing, supra note 87, at ¶ 273.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7).
Wendt, supra note 25, at 393; Pogge, supra note 25.
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seek refugee in an overarching claim of sovereignty. It might be
too extensive and inferential to accuse the AB’s decision on a
regulatory issue such as zeroing of actually eroding the classical
notion of sovereignty as “self-government.”206 Zeroing does not
concern the sanctity of self-determination and non-interference in
the area of national security as stipulated and protected under the
UN Charter. An “emotional appeal” through sovereignty hiding
“a surrogate argument by opponents of some government
proposal”207 risks foreclosing otherwise meaningful and
constructive discourses on the allocation of regulatory competence
between the WTO and its members.208

206 See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic
Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841, 875–76 (2003) (challenging traditional views that
international economic institutions are inherently “sovereignty-subverting”).
207 John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: The United States
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 187 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty
Debate]. See also Ronald A. Brand, Semantic Distinctions in an Age of Legal
Convergence, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (1996) (arguing that “theories of
sovereignty borrowed from prior centuries can no longer accommodate economic
and political reality at the end of the twentieth century”). Dan Sarooshi also
documented a self-serving utilization of sovereignty as a surrogate argument for
specific policy preferences. He emphasized the essentially “contestable” nature of
sovereignty by submitting that “[t]he meaning of the concept of sovereignty is
largely contingent upon the text in which it figures.” Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty,
Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the International Trading System:
Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651, 652 (2004). In other words,
the concept of sovereignty, despite its “prima facie categorical use,” is subject to
“conceptions and interpretations that should be evaluated and maybe amended in
order to account better for the values encompassed by these concepts.” Id., at 654
(quoting Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict: Post-Sovereignty or Mere Change
of Paradigms?, in THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (S. Tierney & C. Warbrick eds., 2004)). This view
parallels that of Stephan Krasner who regarded sovereignty as “organized
hypocrisy.” STEPHAN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9 (1999).
208 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 784–85 (2003) (discussing how the WTO’s
jurisprudence “exemplifies the tension between internationalism and national
governments’ desires to govern and deliver to their demographic constituencies . .
. .”); see also Raustiala, supra note 206, at 843 (observing that “prevailing
sovereignty-based critiques are instead usually disguised arguments about
reallocations of power and the creation of incentives and disincentives for policy
choices”). But cf. Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and the “Rule of Law”, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (1985) (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING
THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RULES (1984)) (arguing that “[t]he kind of international law-making envisioned by
the authors cannot be easily reconciled with the American political tradition”).
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Gravely, an invocation of a Baroque version of sovereignty
runs the risk of nurturing a culture of “veto” among members,
especially powerful members such as the United States, and
consequently poisoning the atmosphere of international
cooperation. Those powerful countries tend to summon this illdefined concept whenever they find compliance with international
law and cooperation within an international organization
politically inconvenient and cumbersome. This culture of veto
may be spread to adventurous isolationism, which could provoke
some governments to disconnect themselves from the WTO
despite the prohibitively high cost.209 Undoubtedly, any of these
consequences would be perilous both to the WTO and those
countries which might self-excommunicate from the WTO in the
name of sovereignty.
It is imperative that in this highly interdependent international
environment, trading nations, even the most powerful ones, should
embrace a novel concept of sovereignty. Trading nations should
realize that all international solutions necessarily involve “a degree
of intrusiveness into domestic governance,” which stresses the
necessity of a cooperative mechanism, including “appropriate
allocation of power” between international institutions and diverse
national legal systems.210 In other words, an altering international
context requires a more flexible concept of sovereignty211 which
departs from that which is symbolized by the peremptory exercise
of unbridled power. Therefore, as Abraham Chayes and Antonia
Chayes argued, nations should adopt the “new sovereignty” which
is more mature, constructive, and participatory.212 For this
purpose, trade norms should be “disaggregated” to make it
possible to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of
reinforcing particular norms.213
This approach will enable
209 Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty, supra note 206, at 849. He aptly viewed
that states in fact join various international organizations to “lock-in desired
policy outcomes” and thus make any exit difficult. Id.
210 John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6-11 (2000).
211 Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (introducing the “contingent and
plastic” view of constructivists on sovereignty).
212 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
213 Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note 207, at 187–88.
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governments to identify and focus on important “policy” issues
that confront the entire international community, such as antidumping and the zeroing practice, without any unnecessary
rhetorical escalation.214
Ironically, this new approach to
sovereignty can actually help governments achieve their own
policy objectives by taming parochialism in the name of
international obligations.215
5.

THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING

5.1. An Exogenous (Political) Test
Although the constitutional adjudication by the WTO tribunal
may be firmly anchored by the WTO’s telos of anti-protectionism,
and thus self-sustaining from the standpoint of the WTO as an
autonomous international organization, such a macro,
organizational sustainability is yet to be tested by the memberdriven political dynamics. Some commentators cast serious doubts
on the wisdom of constitutional adjudication itself. According to
them, constitutional adjudication may be unsustainable because it
tends to short-circuit the necessary and proper political process
which the subject matter of adjudication should have triggered.
Therefore, they view that the AB’s interpretation must be tightly
controlled by political safeguards to prevent it from creeping into
the forbidden realm of constitutional adjudication.
For example, Jeffrey Dunoff found constitutional narratives
unpersuasive in general.
Dunoff discovered a “striking
disjunction” in the debates of trade constitution between the “deep
disciplinary anxieties” of trade law scholars and a positivistic
reality check that “neither WTO texts nor practices suggest that the
WTO is a constitutional entity.”216 He warned that constitutional
214 Id. Cf. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International
Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 776 (1997) (asserting that nowadays
more States wish to regulate trade relations by using norms, rather than through
sovereignty and flexibility).
215 McGinnis argued that the WTO, unlike many sovereigntists’ lamentations,
reinforces its members’ sovereignty by protecting them from their Madisonian
constitutional failures precipitated by rent-seeking special interests or “factions.”
John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
381 (2000).
216 Dunoff, supra note 96, at 647, 649.
He observed that “[t]here is no
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, no constitutional drafting
process, and no readily identifiable constitutional moment” and that “on their
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discourse as a rhetorical strategy adopted by trade law scholars
might be “self-defeating” in that it tends to invoke the very politics
that it wants to avoid.217 Dunoff might find the vindication of his
warning in sovereigntists’ lambasting against the AB’s teleological
interpretation.
In a similar fashion, one might submit that the very notion of
trade constitution or trade constitutionalism as an apolitical
discipline would be even undesirable. According to Jan Klabbers,
the “idea of overcoming politics by insisting on adhering to certain
fixed values” would be unlikely to work since “reference to those
values itself is immensely and intensely political.”218 Furthermore,
Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis viewed that the WTO
constitution as a Madisonian pre-commitment to resist the rentseeking protectionism by special interest groups might be
detrimental because “it is an attempt to take politics out of the
global equation when on the contrary it needs to be brought back
in.”219
These criticisms are not without merits. In a formal matter, the
WTO panel or the AB is merely to “assist” the Dispute Settlement
Body, i.e., the General Council, to “settle” disputes between
Members by delivering their “recommendations.”220
More
importantly, these recommendations should not “add to or
diminish” members’ rights and obligations.221
Also, overemphasizing this judicial governance in the WTO, especially
through a constitutional lens, risks trivializing recognizable political
checks against the WTO panel or the AB, such as WTO members’
“authoritative interpretation” which might potentially override
any panel or AB decision.222 These risks tend to invite more
face, the Uruguay Round texts lack a number of features often associated with
constitutional entities.” Id. at 650–51.
217 Id. at 649.
218 Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 31, 54 (2004)
(quoted in Dunoff, supra note 96, at 665).
219 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance:
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227 (Roger B.
Porter et al. eds. 2001).
220 DSU, supra note 157, art. 19.1.
221 Id. arts. 3.2, 19.2 (stating that the Panel cannot augment or diminish states’
rights and obligations in the covered agreements).
222 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.2 (stating that the Ministerial
Conference and General Council have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations
of this Agreement and Multilateral Trade Agreements).
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fundamental criticisms regarding the WTO tribunal’s alleged lack
of accountability or more broadly the democracy deficit. One of
these critics contends that the WTO produces “quasiconstitutional” rules (“generativity”) flowing from the confidential
WTO tribunal (“insularity”).223 According to this position, the
WTO’s substantive virtue—free trade—may become a potential
threat to the democracy of its members, including (or especially)
the United States in the absence of any democratic disciplines, such
as those under the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act.224
One might suspect that those political risks come at a price that
WTO members should willingly pay to secure the integrity of “an
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system.”225 Yet these risks might not necessarily be high, especially
as long as domestic political economy could accommodate the
AB’s constitutional adjudication. Judith Goldstein and Richard
Steinberg insightfully observed that the U.S. Congress has recently
tolerated “de facto delegation” of trade authority to the WTO’s
judicial law-making function.226 They attributed such domestic
political tolerance to the WTO’s judicial activism to certain

223 See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415
(2000) (explaining the view that the WTO is factionalized, with one-sided factions
using trade policy to their own business benefit).
224 Id. at 418–19.
Ironically, the way in which certain Western countries
administer anti-dumping measures domestically fails to meet their own
democratic standards. For example, the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act does
not apply to anti-dumping proceedings, raising due process questions in the antidumping administration. See Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation,
Integrated International Production, and the United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 66 (1997); Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty
Investigations, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 16–20 (Charles R. Johnston, Jr. ed., 1989); see also Elof
Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 91 (1960) (ruling that the APA was not
applicable to dumping investigations). Moreover, even if domestic industries’
first attempt does not prevail in an anti-dumping complaint, they can refile the
same complaint until they eventually prevail because unlike in other civil
proceedings, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to
the anti-dumping proceeding. Procedure for Initiating a Countervailing Duty
Investigation, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (stating that a countervailing duty
investigation is initiated by administering authority when the authority
determines that a formal investigation is warranted). See also Josephs, supra, at 66.
225 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl.
226 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate?:
Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, LAW &
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-14, at 36–37 (discussing how the Appellate
Body may successfully push for trade openness in the United States and the EU).
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transformative features in the U.S. trade politics.227 First, exportoriented producers have propped up their lobbying effects as they
have witnessed “a clear and credible loss” from protection touted
by import-competing groups.228 Second, trade liberalization tends
to be “self-reinforcing” since these protectionist lobbies “peel off”
as they become unable to sustain protection.229 Third, domestic
“elites and leaders” tend to regard trade liberalization and market
openness as advantageous to the national interest.230
5.2. An Endogenous (Legal) Test
In contrast to the aforementioned exogenous (political) test, an
apolitical, i.e., normative, foundation for constitutional
adjudication derives nowhere but from an “internal” dimension of
law, namely, the way in which members interpret, react and
respond to those constitutional decisions of the WTO tribunal, not
as “one-time grudging compliance,” but as “habitual internalized
obedience.”231
This self-legitimizing osmosis of constitutional adjudication
from the WTO level into the domestic legal realm does not remain
a mere academic imagination. Empirical confirmations are legion
as to real world examples of such legal osmosis. The reactions
from the EU and the U.S. government to the AB’s anti-zeroing
decisions provide cases in point. For example, although the EU
was one of the long-standing users of the zeroing practice, it has
boldly changed its policy direction in a way that fully conforms to
the AB’s ruling since it lost the very first case in EC—Bed Linen.
Instead of resisting the AB’s decisions, it has elected to go after
another main user, the United States.232 Even the U.S. government
(DOC) has recently modified, albeit only partially, its longstanding zeroing practice in the weighted-average-to-weightedaverage comparison in an attempt to comply with the AB’s

Id.
Id. at 38.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 39.
231 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2655 (1997) (discussing how institutional habits lead nations to
compliance in order to avoid friction).
232 See supra Section 2.3.1.
227
228
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decisions, despite severe resistance from the special interest groups
as well as the Congress which is captured by these groups.233
This legal osmosis or “internalization” of the WTO’s
constitutional adjudication leads to a symbiotic co-existence
between the WTO system and domestic legal regimes. In fact,
trade constitution can contribute even to achieving domestic
constitutional goals since the former can provide an effective check
against a Madisonian failure (parochialism) in the domestic
arena.234 Public choice theorists teach us that gains from trade are
often underrepresented while its costs are overrepresented.235
Under these circumstances, constitutional adjudication tends to
empower local voices for free trade and competition. For example,
since the WTO rulings on zeroing, U.S. domestic consumer groups
have stepped up their lobbying efforts to the government with a
view to the elimination of all zeroing practices that serve the
interests of certain domestic producers at the expense of U.S.
consumers and consuming industries.236
233 See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average
Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification 71
Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006) (outlining the DOC’s modified antidumping
investigation methodology); Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Makes Change in Dumping
Methodology to Comply with WTO Case, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 26 (Jan. 4, 2007)
(showing an example of internalization through “executive action,” such as the
change of administrative interpretation). See Koh, supra note 231, at 2657 (“Legal
internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the
domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative
action, or some combination of the three.”).
234 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of
Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES, No. 07-15, at 2–3 (arguing that the WTO’s regulatory scheme shifted
from the legislative to the judicial sector by “freeing member states from capture
by entrenched domestic interests”).
235 See Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines
on Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 184–86 (2007) (discussing how
protectionist trade practice can be detrimental to U.S. economics).
236 See Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (“CITAC”), Rebuttal
Comments on the Commerce Department’s “Zeroing” Proposal, 71 Fed. Reg.
11189, May 4, 2006, available at http://www.citac.info/about/issues/zeroing
/CITAC_On_Zeroing_2300285_1.pdf (urging the Department of Commerce to
“eliminate zeroing from all antidumping calculation methodologies”) (emphasis
added); Robin Lanier, A Letter to Secretary of Commerce (Re: “Zeroing” of
Duties), Jan. 6, 2005 (proposing to “eliminate the practice of zeroing in all
dumping cases”).
Harold Koh defines this phenomenon as “legislative
internalization” which “occurs when domestic lobbying embeds international law
norms into binding domestic legislation or even constitutional law that officials of
a noncomplying government must then obey as part of the domestic legal fabric.”
Koh, supra note 231, at 2657.
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Even if certain domestic producers may attempt to preserve the
zeroing practice in the domestic court, which usually renders huge
deference to agencies like the DOC under the Chevron doctrine, the
court can still respect the decisions of the WTO (AB) under the
Charming Betsy doctrine, which prescribes that U.S. law should be
interpreted consistently with international law.237 In other words,
between two possible statutory constructions of the antidumping
statute, i.e., one which does permit zeroing and the other which
does not, the U.S. court could choose the latter since the WTO
tribunal unambiguously ruled against zeroing. To this extent, any
modicum of deference which the DOC would have enjoyed under
the second prong of the Chevron doctrine is squeezed to nil.238
In sum, this “transnational legal process,” which internalizes
the WTO norms on zeroing via the executive, legislative and
judicial channels, continuously enhances the WTO members’
susceptibility to the WTO’s constitutional adjudication. As WTO
members repeat and regularize this process, and thus as domestic
law becomes enmeshed with “sticky” international law,239 their
compliance with the outcome of constitutional adjudication

237 This situation may fall within the rubric of “judicial internalization” which
Harold Koh defines as an implicit incorporation of international law into the
domestic legal system through interpreting existing statutes harmoniously with
international law or as an explicit incorporation via “transnational public law
litigation.” Koh, supra note 231, at 2657.
238 A recent North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) Article 1904
bi-national panel (the Mittal panel) has followed the AB’s anti-zeroing
jurisprudence by invoking the Charming Betsy doctrine. NAFTA Article 1904.2
requires the tribunal whose mandate is a judicial review on government’s
decisions on trade remedy issues such as zeroing to apply the same laws,
regulations and even standards of review as a court of a defending country (the
U.S. in this dispute). In this sense, the Mittal panel spoke on behalf of the U.S.
court. It ruled that “zeroing seems inconsistent . . . with both the underlying
principle of the Charming Betsy canon, to respect the law of nations wherever
possible, and the United States’ Uruguay Round negotiation goal of obtaining an
effective dispute-resolution system.” In the Matter of Carbon and Certain Alloy
Steel Wire Rod from Canada, USA-CDA-2006-1094-04, Nov. 28, 2007, at 38. But
see Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and Charming Betsy: Is There a Place
for the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 238–39 (2003)
(concluding that the Charming Betsy doctrine should not undermine the operation
of the Chevron doctrine).
239 See Koh, supra note 227, at 2654–55 (“Domestic decisionmaking becomes
‘enmeshed’ with international legal norms, as institutional arrangements for the
making and maintenance of an international commitment become entrenched in
domestic legal and political processes.”).
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becomes ever closer to a “default pattern.”240 Furthermore, in most
cases trade constitution is firmly in harmony with fundamental
principles of domestic (constitutional) law, such as free interstate
commerce and anti-parochialism. This “sovereignty-enhancing”
aspect of internalization reinforces its self-legitimizing nature.241
Under these circumstances, members’ “loyalty” to the WTO regime
mitigates, or even replaces, their initial demand for “voice” or
threat of “exit.”242
6.

CONCLUSION

This article has challenged major critiques to the recent WTO
case law that invalidated zeroing in a radical departure from the
old GATT case law, which legalized the same practice. The article
has argued that critics to the AB’s zeroing decisions misconstrue
the nature of the WTO, its judicial review, and sovereignty itself.
The article has also demonstrated why, and how, the recent WTO
zeroing jurisprudence can be appreciated as a form of
constitutional adjudication.
Finally, it has contended that
constitutional adjudication is self-legitimizing to the extent that
such adjudication communicates with the domestic legal system
via various forms of internalization, be it a judicial
accommodation, as regards the Charming Betsy doctrine, or a policy
change at the executive level. After all, compliance leads to
legitimacy insomuch as legitimacy renders compliance pull.
This mutually reinforcing dynamic between internalization and
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication on zeroing may crystallize
into a certain cultural phenomenon. In this regard, “constitutional
culture” may be defined as the “cultural cohesion that habitually
accepts the propriety and necessity of constitutional
compliance.”243 In fact, internalization itself is “constitutive” and

240 Id. See also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 172, at 935 (observing that some
international tribunals’ rulings can “mobilize compliance constituencies to press
governments to adhere to their treaty obligations”) (emphasis added).
241 See ALVAREZ, supra note 167, at 618.
Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming
Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 272–73 (2008) (suggesting that inter-judicial coalitions could
enhance democratic governance).
242 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 76–105 (1970)
(exploring the impact of loyalty on the “voice” and “exit” dynamics).
243 Allan Ides, The Emerging Transnational Constitution: Introduction, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 187, 188 (2003).
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The WTO’s
thus facilitative of constitutional culture.244
constitutional culture denotes the “generally shared” and
“intersubjective” understanding of the WTO’s ultimate goal (telos)
and the normative universe (nomos) in which such a goal is
pursued.245 Within the WTO’s nomos defined by its telos, an
unremitting interaction, or discourse, among members of the
global trading community forms, and fortifies, the WTO’s
constitutional culture via a communitarian mechanism of
habituation.
Importantly, the constitutional culture should also be didactic.
The WTO’s constitutional jurisprudence, no matter how much it
has evolved thus far, is still remote and inaccessible to ordinary
people. Most people, even scholars in this field, associate it with
esoteric codes, which can be deciphered only by certain
cognoscenti.246 With such a low level of comprehensibility, the
legal force cannot overcome the short-term protectionist politics
which is often well-organized and thus very effective in capturing
trade policy-makers. Therefore, the public should become further
educated in international trade law and trade constitution so that
well-informed deliberation, not misleading protectionist banners,
will guide their political choices.247 The necessity of public
education and social marketing on the WTO’s constitutional
jurisprudence may be analogous to the reason why American
citizens, not only legal scholars, are taught on certain paramount
constitutional jurisprudence, such as Marbury and Brown. At this
juncture, the academia bears a critical responsibility in framing and
dispersing discourses on the trade constitution and constitutional
adjudication.248 Such discourses will eventually provide the public
with helpful heuristics with which to better comprehend

Koh, supra note 231, at 2646.
See, e.g., Lang, supra note 26, at 84–85, 95, 105–06 (employing a
“constructivist” perspective on the WTO system); Robert M. Cover, Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (observing that “no set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give
it meaning.”); id. at 9 (defining nomos as a “present world constituted by a system
of tension between reality and vision”).
246 See Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a
Practical Discourse, in TRADE AS THE GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?:
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63 (Padideh Ala’i et al eds. 2006)
(discussing the complexity of WTO jurisprudence).
247 Id.
248 I owe this insight to David Gerber.
244
245
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international trade law, thereby paving a propitious ground for the
WTO’s constitutional culture.
In conclusion, the WTO’s constitutional culture liberates us
from a long-standing “positivist nostrum” based on an outmoded
belief that “multilateral mechanisms for making global law,
binding on the international community as a whole, do not
exist.”249 Only this liberation can disabuse trading nations of their
misguided mercantilist interests, which zeroing represents, and
redefine their identities and interests within the global trading
system from impervious sovereign entities to enlightened normbuilders.250

ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 586–87.
See generally Cho, Gemeinschaft, supra note 26. From a standpoint of
sociological institutionalism, Martha Finnermore envisioned “continuing and
even increasing adherence to multilateralism—even when it runs contrary to
expressed national interests—because it embodies some set of values central to the
larger world culture.” Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics:
Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996).
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